

### Revised forms for the submission of the Confidence-Building Measures

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that all States Parties present the following declaration, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

#### Declaration form on Nothing to Declare or Nothing New to Declare for use in the information exchange

Measure	Nothing to declare	Nothing new to declare	Year of last declaration if nothing new to declare
A, part 1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox" value="2016"/>
A, part 2 (ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox" value="2016"/>
A, part 2 (iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox" value="2016"/>
B	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox" value="2016"/>
E	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox" value="2016"/>
G	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox" value="2016"/>

(Please mark the appropriate box(es) for each measure with a tick, and fill in the year of last declaration in the last column where applicable.)

Date:

*12 April 2017*

State Party to the Convention:

*Norway*

Date of ratification/accession to the Convention:

*1 August 1973*

National point of contact:

*Erik Berger Husem  
(Erik.Berger.Husem@mfa.no)*

### **Active promotion of contacts**

The Third Review Conference agreed that States parties continue to implement the following:

"Active promotion of contacts between scientists, other experts and facilities engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges and visits for joint research on a mutually agreed basis."

In order to actively promote professional contacts between scientists, joint research projects and other activities aimed at preventing or reducing the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and at improving international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, the Seventh Review Conference encouraged States parties to share forward looking information, to the extent possible,

- on planned international conferences, seminars, symposia and similar events dealing with biological research directly related to the Convention, and
- on other opportunities for exchange of scientists, joint research or other measures to promote contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including through the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

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# Confidence-Building Measure "A"

## Part 1 Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to implement the following:

"Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention."

### Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

Data should be provided by States Parties on each facility, within their territory or under their jurisdiction or control anywhere, which has any maximum containment laboratories meeting those criteria for such maximum containment laboratories as specified in the latest edition of the WHO<sup>1</sup> Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or OIE<sup>2</sup> Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent guidelines adopted by relevant international organisations, such as those designated as biosafety level 4 (BL4, BSL4 or P4) or equivalent standards.

States Parties that do not possess a facility meeting criteria for such maximum containment should continue to Form A, part 1 (ii).

### Form A, part 1 (i)

*Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories<sup>3</sup>*

- |  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Name(s) of facility <sup>4</sup>  | N/A |
| 2. Responsible public or private organization or company   |     |
| 3. Location and postal address   |     |
| 4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence |     |
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<sup>1</sup> World Health Organization

<sup>2</sup> World Organization for Animal Health

<sup>3</sup> The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.

<sup>4</sup> For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".

5. Number of maximum containment units<sup>5</sup> within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m<sup>2</sup>)

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6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

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**Form A, part 1 (ii)**

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents<sup>6</sup> on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3 <sup>7</sup>	<i>yes</i>
Biosafety level 2 <sup>8</sup> (if applicable)	<i>yes</i>

Any additional relevant information as appropriate:

***FHI: Research is related to development of methods for rapid identification of highly pathogenic microbes in clinical microbiology***

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**Part 2 Exchange of information on national biological defence research and development programmes**

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties are to implement the following:

In the interest of increasing the transparency of national research and development programmes on biological defence, the States Parties will declare whether or not they conduct such programmes. States Parties agreed to provide, annually, detailed information on their biological defence research and development programmes including summaries of the objectives and costs of effort performed by contractors and in other facilities. If no biological defence research and development programme is being conducted, a null report will be provided.

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<sup>5</sup> In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, or equivalent.

<sup>6</sup> Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

<sup>7</sup> In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

<sup>8</sup> In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

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States Parties will make declarations in accordance with the attached forms, which require the following information:

- (1) The objective and summary of the research and development activities under way indicating whether work is conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research;
- (2) Whether contractor or other non-defence facilities are utilized and the total funding provided to that portion of the programme;
- (3) The organizational structure of the programme and its reporting relationships; and
- (4) The following information concerning the defence and other governmental facilities in which the biological defence research and development programme is concentrated:
  - (a) location;
  - (b) the floor areas (sqM) of the facilities including that dedicated to each of BL2, BL3 and BL4 level laboratories;
  - (c) the total number of staff employed, including those contracted full time for more than six months;
  - (d) numbers of staff reported in (c) by the following categories: civilian, military, scientists, technicians, engineers, support and administrative staff;
  - (e) a list of the scientific disciplines of the scientific/engineering staff;
  - (f) the source and funding levels in the following three areas: research, development, and test and evaluation; and
  - (g) the policy regarding publication and a list of publicly-available papers and reports.

**Form A, part 2 (i)**

**National biological defence research and development programmes Declaration**

Are there any national programmes to conduct biological defence research and development within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or control anywhere? Activities of such programmes would include prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

- a) The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI): YES*
- b) Institute of Microbiology (FML): YES*
- c) Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI): YES*

If the answer is Yes, complete Form A, part 2 (ii) which will provide a description of each programme.

**Form A, part 2 (ii)**

**National biological defence research and development programmes**

**Description**

1. State the objectives and funding of each programme and summarize the principal research and development activities conducted in the programme. Areas to be addressed shall include: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

**a) The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)**

*Current RDT&E activities include: hazard prediction, consequence management, diagnostics, aerobiology, detection, identification, sampling, decontamination, physical protection, medical countermeasures, and modelling & simulation.*

*Past RDT&E activities include: hazard prediction, consequence management, diagnostics, aerobiology, detection, identification, sampling, decontamination, physical protection, medical countermeasures, and modelling & simulation.*

*National and International collaboration: The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) participates in biodefense RDT&E collaborations together with National civilian research organizations as well as international civilian and military research organizations from Allied Nations. The RDT&E collaborations are arranged within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Defence Agency (EDA), as well as through bilateral agreements. FFI participates in biosecurity-related RDT&E collaborations together with National civilian research organizations as well as international civilian and military research organizations through the research and innovation framework of the European Union (EU) as executed by the European Commission (EC). FFI supports the Government of the Kingdom of Norway with expertise in biodefense and biosecurity, to ensure the highest standard in societal and military security concerning prevention, preparedness and protection against all biological hazards.*

**b) Institute of Microbiology (FML)**

*Diagnostics, transmission studies, epidemiology, immunology*

*Bacterial groups: Bacillus, chlamydia, francisella, legionella, staphylococcus*

*Viruses: Hantavirus*

*Toxins from: Bacillus, clostridium, shigella, staphylococcus, yersinia*

**c) Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI)**

*Objectives of the programme is development of diagnostic methods for rapid detection of highly pathogenic microbes in clinical microbiology.*

2. State the total funding for each programme and its source.

**a) The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)**

*Total funding per year: € 1 500 000.-. Funding sources: 80% Norwegian Ministry of Defence/Armed Forces, 20% European Union (EU)/private sector/other.*

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***b) Institute of Microbiology (FML)***

***Total laboratory funding per year: NOK 4.5 million (approx. € 480 000)***

***100% by the Ministry of Defence***

***c) Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI)***

***Total laboratory funding is € 600 000, mainly funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services. A small part, about 4% funding by EU programme EMERGE.***

3. Are aspects of these programmes conducted under contract with industry, academic institutions, or in other non-defence facilities?

***a) FFI: No***

***b) FML: No***

***c) FHI: Yes. Part of the programme is collaboration with Public Health Institutions in Europe as part of the EU funded project EMERGE. A Norwegian and a Nordic network for Biopreparedness diagnostics have been established.***

4. If yes, what proportion of the total funds for each programme is expended in these contracted or other facilities?

***FHI: Funding for travel related to project meetings and quality assurance program.***

5. Summarize the objectives and research areas of each programme performed by contractors and in other facilities with the funds identified under paragraph 4.

***FHI: Quality assurance of methods for detection of highly pathogenic bacteria.***

6. Provide a diagram of the organizational structure of each programme and the reporting relationships (include individual facilities participating in the programme).

7. Provide a declaration in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii) for each facility, both governmental and non-governmental, which has a substantial proportion of its resources devoted to each national biological defence research and development programme, within the territory of the reporting State, or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere.

**Form A, part 2 (iii)**

**National biological defence research and development programmes**

**Facilities**

Complete a form for each facility declared in accordance with paragraph 7 in Form A, part 2 (ii).

In shared facilities, provide the following information for the biological defence research and development portion only.

1. What is the name of the facility?

***a) Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)***

***b) Institute of Microbiology (FML)***

*c) Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI)*

2. Where is it located (include both address and geographical location)?

*a) FFI: Instituttveien 20, NO-2007 Kjeller, Norway*

*Website: www.ffi.no*

*Geographical location: 59.974643,11.049177*

*b) FML: Lovisenberggaten 8, N – 0456 Oslo. This location is within the confinement of the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI).*

*Postal address: P.O.Box 4302 Nydalen,*

*N-0402 Oslo, Norway*

*c) FHI: Lovisenberggaten 8, NO-0456 Oslo*

*Website: www.fhi.no*

3. Floor area of laboratory areas by containment level:

*a) FFI*

*BL2 65 (sqM)*

*BL3 15 (sqM)*

*Total laboratory floor area: 100 (sqM) (includes non-BL laboratories)*

*b) FML*

*BL2 175 (sqM)*

*BL3 175 (sqM)*

*Total laboratory floor area. 350 (sqM)*

*c) FHI:*

*BL2 80 (sqM)*

*BL3 40 (sqM)*

*Total laboratory floor area. 120 (sqM)*

4. The organizational structure of each facility.

(i) Total number of personnel *a) FFI: 12 b) FML: 7 c) FHI: 3*

(ii) Division of personnel:

Military *a) FFI: 0 b) FML: 2 c) FHI: 0*

Civilian *a) FFI: 12 b) FML: 5 c) FHI: 3*

(iii) Division of personnel by category:

Scientists *a) FFI: 4 b) FML: 2 c) FHI: 2*



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Engineers	<i>a) FFI: 5</i>	<i>b) FML: 3</i>	<i>c) FHI: 3</i>
Technicians	<i>a) FFI: 3</i>	<i>b) FML: 1</i>	<i>c) FHI: 0</i>
Administrative and support staff	<i>a) FFI: 0</i>	<i>b) FML: 1</i>	<i>c) FHI: 0</i>

(iv) List the scientific disciplines represented in the scientific/engineering staff.

*a) FFI:*

*Molecular biology*

*Biotechnology*

*Microbiology*

*Aerobiology*

*Biochemistry*

*b) FML:*

*Human and veterinarian infection*

*c) FHI:*

*Clinical microbiology and molecular biology*

(v) Are contractor staff working in the facility? If so, provide an approximate number.

*None for all three organizations*

(vi) What is (are) the source(s) of funding for the work conducted in the facility, including indication if activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence?

*a) FFI: Total funding per year: € 1 500 000.-. Funding sources: 80% Norwegian Ministry of Defence/Armed Forces, 20% European Union (EU)/private sector/other.*

*b) FML: Governmental funding by the Ministry of Defence (100%)*

*c) FHI: Ministry of Health and Care Services*

(vii) What are the funding levels for the following programme areas:

*a) FFI:*

*Research € 750 000.-*

*Development € 375 000.-*

*Test and evaluation € 375 000.-*

*b) FML: N/A*

*c) FHI: N/A*

(viii) Briefly describe the publication policy of the facility:

- a) **FFI: Publication in open reports and peer-reviewed scientific journals.**
- b) **FML: Reviewed international scientific journals**
- c) **FHI: Research will be published in international scientific journals**

(ix) Provide a list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work published during the previous 12 months. (To include authors, titles and full references.)

a) **FFI:**

*2017. Davidson, R. K., Antunes, W., Madslie, E. H., & Torroba Perez, T. From food defence to food supply chain integrity. British Food Journal, 119(1), 52-66.*

*2016. Dybwad, M., Aarskaug, T., Fykse, E. M., Madslie, E. H., & Blatny, J. M. Complete genome sequences of six Legionella pneumophila isolates from two collocated outbreaks of Legionnaires' disease in 2005 and 2008 in Sarpsborg/Fredrikstad, Norway. Genome Announcements, 4(6), e01367-16.*

*2016. MetaSUB International Consortium. The metagenomics and metadesign of the subways and urban biomes (MetaSUB) international consortium inaugural meeting report. Microbiome, 4(1), 1-14.*

*2016. Plamboeck, A. H., Stöven, S., Davidson, R. D., Fykse, E. M., Griffiths, M., Nieuwenhuizen, M., ... & van der Schans, M. Laboratory analysis of CBRN-substances: Stakeholder networks as clue to higher CBRN resilience in Europe. TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry, 85, 2-9.*

*2016. Fykse, E. M., Aarskaug, T., Madslie, E. H., & Dybwad, M. Microbial community structure in a full-scale anaerobic treatment plant during start-up and first year of operation revealed by high-throughput 16S rRNA gene amplicon sequencing. Bioresource technology, 222, 380-387.*

*2016. Pedersen, B., Gorzkowska-Sobas, A. A., Gerevini, M., Prugger, R., Belenguer, J., Maletti, M., ... & Davidson, R. K. Protecting our food: Can standard food safety analysis detect adulteration of food products with selected chemical agents?. TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry, 85, 42-46.*

*2016. Borch-Pedersen, K., Lindbäck, T., Madslie, E. H., Kidd, S. W., O'Sullivan, K., Granum, P. E., & Aspholm, M. The Cooperative and Interdependent Roles of GerA, GerK, and Ynd in Germination of Bacillus licheniformis Spores. Applied and environmental microbiology, 82(14), 4279-4287.*

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2016. Valseeth, K., Nesbø, C. L., Easterday, W. R., Turner, W. C., Olsen, J. S., Stenseth, N. C., & Haverkamp, T. H. Draft genome sequences of two *Bacillus anthracis* strains from Etosha National Park, Namibia. *Genome announcements*, 4(4), e00861-16.

2016. Davidson, RK., et al. "Echinococcus across the north: Current knowledge, future challenges." *Food and Waterborne Parasitology* 4 (2016): 39-53.

2015. Rønning, HT, Madslie, EH, Asp, TN, Granum, PE. Identification and quantification of lichenysin - a possible source of food poisoning. *Food Addit Contam Part A Chem Anal Control Expo Risk Assess.*32 (12):2120-30. doi: 10.1080/19440049.2015.1096967.

2015. Fykse, EM, T Tjærnhage, TT Humppi, VS Eggen, A Ingebretsen, G Skogan, G Olofsson, P Wästerby, P-Å Grandmark, A Larsson, M Dybwad, JM Blatny. Airborne bacterial communities at three different locations studied by MALDI-TOF MS, MIDI and 16S rRNA sequence analysis. *Aerobiologia*, DOI 10.11007/s10453-015-9363-9.

b) *FML*: No publications

c) *FHI*: No publications in 2016

5. Briefly describe the biological defence work carried out at the facility, including type(s) of micro-organisms<sup>9</sup> and/or toxins studied, as well as outdoor studies of biological aerosols.

a) *FFI*:

*Current RDT&E activities include: hazard prediction, consequence management, diagnostics, aerobiology, detection, identification, sampling, decontamination, physical protection, medical countermeasures, and modelling & simulation.*

*Type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins studied: Category A and B biological agents as defined by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.*

b) *FML*:

*Diagnostic of infection due to francisella.*

c) *FHI*:

*Objectives of the programme is development of diagnostic methods for rapid detection of highly pathogenic microbes in clinical microbiology. Quality assurance of methods for detection of highly pathogenic bacteria.*

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<sup>9</sup> Including viruses and prions.



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## Confidence-Building Measure "B"

### Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to implement the following:

Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins, and on all such events that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. The information provided on events that deviate from the norm will include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases.

The Seventh Review Conference agreed the following:

No universal standards exist for what might constitute a deviation from the normal pattern.

### Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

1. Exchange of data on outbreaks that seem to deviate from the normal pattern is considered particularly important in the following cases:
  - When the cause of the outbreak cannot be readily determined or the causative agent<sup>10</sup> is difficult to diagnose,
  - When the disease may be caused by organisms which meet the criteria for risk groups III or IV, according to the classification in the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual,
  - When the causative agent is exotic to a given geographical region,
  - When the disease follows an unusual pattern of development,
  - When the disease occurs in the vicinity of research centres and laboratories subject to exchange of data under item A,
  - When suspicions arise of the possible occurrence of a new disease.
2. In order to enhance confidence, an initial report of an outbreak of an infectious disease or a similar occurrence that seems to deviate from the normal pattern should be given promptly after cognizance of the outbreak and should be followed up by annual reports. To enable States Parties to follow a standardized procedure, the Conference has agreed that Form B should be used, to the extent information is known and/or applicable, for the exchange of annual information.
3. The declaration of electronic links to national websites or to websites of international, regional or other organizations which provide information on disease outbreaks (notably outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern) may also satisfy the declaration requirement under Form B.

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<sup>10</sup> It is understood that this may include organisms made pathogenic by molecular biology techniques, such as genetic engineering.

4. In order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities and in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, States Parties are encouraged to invite experts from other States Parties to assist in the handling of an outbreak, and to respond favourably to such invitations, respecting applicable national legislation and relevant international instruments.

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**Form B**

**Information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern<sup>11</sup>**

***Norway:** There have been no unusual outbreaks in the past years, including human, animal and plant diseases (see table below detailing registered diseases in the past years).*

1. Time of cognizance of the outbreak \_\_\_\_\_
2. Location and approximate area affected \_\_\_\_\_
3. Type of disease/intoxication \_\_\_\_\_
4. Suspected source of disease/intoxication \_\_\_\_\_
5. Possible causative agent(s) \_\_\_\_\_
6. Main characteristics of systems \_\_\_\_\_
7. Detailed symptoms, when applicable \_\_\_\_\_
  - respiratory \_\_\_\_\_
  - circulatory \_\_\_\_\_
  - neurological/behavioural \_\_\_\_\_
  - intestinal \_\_\_\_\_
  - dermatological \_\_\_\_\_
  - nephrological \_\_\_\_\_
  - other \_\_\_\_\_
8. Deviation(s) from the normal pattern as regards \_\_\_\_\_
  - type \_\_\_\_\_
  - development \_\_\_\_\_
  - place of occurrence \_\_\_\_\_
  - time of occurrence \_\_\_\_\_
  - symptoms \_\_\_\_\_
  - virulence pattern \_\_\_\_\_
  - drug resistance pattern \_\_\_\_\_
  - agent(s) difficult to diagnose \_\_\_\_\_
  - presence of unusual vectors \_\_\_\_\_
  - other \_\_\_\_\_
9. Approximate number of primary cases \_\_\_\_\_
10. Approximate number of total cases \_\_\_\_\_
11. Number of deaths \_\_\_\_\_
12. Development of the outbreak \_\_\_\_\_
13. Measures taken \_\_\_\_\_

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<sup>11</sup> See paragraph 2 of the chapeau to Confidence-Building Measure B.

<b>Disease</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Anthrax</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>AIDS</b>	16	22	25	29	18	11	17
<b>Botulism</b>	0	1	0	8	4	13	1
<b>Brucellosis</b>	0	2	4	2	2	2	4
<b>Campylobacteriosis</b>	2851	2673	2933	3291	3745	2320	2317
<b>Cholera</b>	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Creutzfeldt-Jacobs</b>	10	12	0	14	11	17	1
<b>Diphtheria</b>	0	0	0	0	2	2	1
<b>Enteropathogenic E. coli</b>	477	366	373	281	971	631	462
<b>Giardiasis, native and imported</b>	307	262	179	227	264	248	343
<b>Gonorrhoea</b>	263	405	443	506	682	839	1096
<b>Hemorrhagic fever</b>	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Hepatitis A</b>	40	46	40	51	75	33	42
<b>Hepatitis B, disease</b>	53	27	46	30	22	19	23
<b>Hepatitis B, carrier</b>	836	745	661	710	676	795	741
<b>Hepatitis C, disease</b>	2351	1811	1526	1318	1213	1183	772
<b>HIV infection</b>	274	256	242	234	249	221	220
<b>Legionellosis, native and imported</b>	35	48	23	40	51	61	43
<b>Leprosy</b>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Lyme borreliosis</b>	278	289	255	315	578	423	408
<b>Malaria, imported</b>	34	37	37	87	120	94	75
<b>Measles</b>	2	3	4	8	3	14	0
<b>Meningitis, bacterial</b>	44	39	24	27	17	19	23
<b>Mumps</b>	2	12	30	35	18	182	83
<b>Nephropathia epidemica</b>	21	21	13	19	42	11	10
<b>Pertussis</b>	5562	3567	4248	2609	3032	1903	2209
<b>Plague</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Pneumococemia</b>	802	747	626	620	569	522	599
<b>Poliomyelitis</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Rabies</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Relapsing fever</b>	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Rubella</b>	0	0	1	3	3	0	0
<b>Salmonella enteritis</b>	1235	1366	1372	1362	1138	828	865
<b>Shigellosis</b>	152	132	77	104	93	85	83
<b>Streptococcus group A invasive disease</b>	171	161	137	183	187	205	197

(Table by FML)



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## Confidence-Building Measure "C"

### Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States parties continue to implement the following:

Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained in this research.

**Research results are generally published in open peer-reviewed scientific journals. Also see list of publications and website mentioned in Form A, part 2 (iii)**

### Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following:

1. It is recommended that basic research in biosciences, and particularly that directly related to the Convention should generally be unclassified and that applied research to the extent possible, without infringing on national and commercial interests, should also be unclassified.
2. States parties are encouraged to provide information on their policy as regards publication of results of biological research, indicating, *inter alia*, their policies as regards publication of results of research carried out in research centres and laboratories subject to exchange of information under item A and publication of research on outbreaks of diseases covered by item B, and to provide information on relevant scientific journals and other relevant scientific publications generally available to States parties.
3. The Third Review Conference discussed the question of cooperation and assistance as regards the safe handling of biological material covered by the Convention. It concluded that other international forums were engaged in this field and expressed its support for efforts aimed at enhancing such cooperation.

## Confidence-Building Measure "D"

(Deleted)

## Confidence-Building Measure "E"

### Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

At the Third Review Conference the States parties agreed to implement the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

As an indication of the measures which they have taken to implement the Convention, States parties shall declare whether they have legislation, regulations or other measures:

- To prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere;
- a) *The Norwegian Penal Code (LOV-2005-05-20-28, as amended 2016; English translation not available). Section 142 prohibits the acquisition, possession, transport, transfer, production, use, or other illegal involvement with biological weapons and any equipment meant for their production/use or delivery. Sections 107-108 make it a war crime to use or conspire to use biological weapons in armed conflicts. Sections 131-136 prohibit terrorist use of biological weapons, acting as an accomplice to acts of terrorism, participation in or recruitment to terrorist organisations, training and incitement to acts of terrorism, and the financing of terrorism. Sections 237-240 prohibit the spread of disease, the use of poison, and the pollution of air, water or the ground with a view to endangering life and the environment. Sections 355-357 make it illegal to expose or conspire to expose the public to any serious danger that could easily lead to the loss of human life.*
- In relation to the export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants or of toxins in accordance with the Convention;
- b) *Act relating to control of the export of strategic goods, services, technology, etc., (Export Control Act) (LOV-1987-12-18-93, as amended 2015).*
- c) *Act relating to the regulation of imports and exports (LOV-1997-06-06-32, as amended 2015). Under this Act, a special licence is required to import or export certain goods.*
- d) *Act on Customs Duties and Movement of Goods (Customs Act) (LOV-2007-12-21-119, as amended 2016).*
- e) *Act relating to food production and food safety etc. (Food Act) (LOV-2003-12-19-124, as amended 2015; updated English translation not available). Under the Food Act, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority is responsible for ensuring compliance and may make the necessary decisions to ensure the implementation of the Act. This includes prohibiting imports, exports and trade in plants/animals/food, or ordering the withdrawal of such products from the market, the closure of premises, isolation, killing of animals, destruction, disinfecting, labelling/stamping or other special measures.*
- f) *Regulations to the Act on Customs Duties and Movement of Goods (Customs Regulations) (FOR-2008-12-17-1502, as amended 2016), regulating the powers of the customs authorities to seize, destroy or dispose of any illegally imported substances and impose sanctions in connection with attempted illegal export; and Export Control Regulations (FOR-2013-06-19-718, as amended 2016) and legislation relating to control of the export of strategic goods, services and technology.*

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- g) *Regulations relating to the export of defence-related products, dual-use items, technology and services – Implementing legislation. Laid down by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 June 2013 (FOR-2013-06-19-718).*
  - h) *Regulations on the notification of, and measures to be taken in the event of, serious events of significance for international public health (the IHR Regulations) (FOR-2007-12-21-1573, as amended 2015).*
  - i) *Regulations on the import, transport and other handling of materials that are infectious to humans (FOR-1996-09-12- 903, as amended 2013).*
  - j) *Regulations amending the regulations on plant health (FOR-2016-03-29-327), which impose restrictions on the production, transport, packaging, import and export of plants.*
  - k) *Regulations relating to trade in animals (FOR-2004-02-20-464, as amended 2016).*
  - l) *Regulations on the veterinary control of products at border stations (FOR-2005-11-30-1347, as amended 2014, and FOR-2008-06-26-726, as amended 2015); and Regulations on the inspection and control of animal products in transit or for import (FOR-1999-10-27-1166, as amended 2015).*

*The implementing agencies are Norwegian Customs Authorities, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Police Security Service.*

- In relation to biosafety and biosecurity

- a) *Act relating to the control of communicable diseases (LOV-1994-08-05-55, as amended 2015; updated English translation not available). This Act sets out measures to prevent communicable diseases from being brought into the country or spread to other countries (quarantine measures), including measures in respect of persons, animals, means of transport, goods and objects that may conceivably transmit communicable diseases. The Act also contains provisions on measures such as compulsory medical examinations and disinfection, as well as documentation requirements in connection with entry into and departure from Norway and in connection with the import and export of goods.*

**Authorities:**

*Directorate for Customs and Excise  
Norwegian Police Security Service  
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Export Control)  
Food Control Agency  
State Plant Inspection Office*

*(All Acts and Regulations are available in Norwegian at [www.lovdato.no](http://www.lovdato.no) An English version of many Norwegian acts and regulations is available at [https://lovdato.no/info/information\\_in\\_english](https://lovdato.no/info/information_in_english), but these are not official translations, and in many cases they have not been updated to include the latest amendments.)*

States parties shall complete the attached form (Form E) and shall be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations, or written details of other measures on request to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs or to an individual State party. On an annual basis States parties shall indicate, also on the attached form, whether or not there has been any amendment to their legislation, regulations or other measures.

## Form E

### Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

Relating to	Legislation	Regulations	Other measures <sup>12</sup>	Amended since last year
(a) Development, production stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
(b) Exports of micro-organisms <sup>13</sup> and toxins	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes export lists are regularly updated
(c) Imports of micro-organisms <sup>11</sup> and toxins	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes export lists are regularly updated
(d) Biosafety <sup>14</sup> and biosecurity <sup>15</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

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<sup>12</sup> Including guidelines.

<sup>13</sup> Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the Convention.

<sup>14</sup> In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual or equivalent national or international guidance.

<sup>15</sup> In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance or equivalent national or international guidance.

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## Confidence-Building Measure "F"

### Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

In the interest of increasing transparency and openness, States parties shall declare whether or not they conducted any offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes since 1 January 1946.

If so, States parties shall provide information on such programmes, in accordance with Form F.

### Form F

### Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

1. Date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party.

*1 August 1973*

2. Past offensive biological research and development programmes:

*No*

- Period(s) of activities

- Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether work was performed concerning production, test and evaluation, weaponization, stockpiling of biological agents, the destruction programme of such agents and weapons, and other related research.

3. Past defensive biological research and development programmes:

*Yes*

Period(s) of activities; *Ongoing*

*Work on human and animal diseases, but nothing bearing on what is understood as a biological programme related to defence activities. All BTWC-related work that has been performed in Norway by military, public health, university, or other official facilities, is published in open international scientific papers.*

- Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether or not work was conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination, and other related research, with location if possible.

*The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) – see activities described in form A (military)*

*The Institute of Microbiology (FML) – see activities described in form A (military)*

*Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI) – fully civilian institution*

## **Confidence-Building Measure "G"**

### **Declaration of vaccine production facilities**

To further increase the transparency of biological research and development related to the Convention and to broaden scientific and technical knowledge as agreed in Article X, each State party will declare all facilities, both governmental and non-governmental, within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, producing vaccines licensed by the State party for the protection of humans. Information shall be provided on Form G attached.

### **Form G**

#### **Declaration of vaccine production facilities**

1. Name of facility:
2. Location (mailing address):
3. General description of the types of diseases covered:

#### ***Pharmaq***

*Located at Industrivegen 50, N-7863 Overhalla.*

*-Produces large amounts of various fish vaccines.*

#### ***The National Veterinary Institute***

*Ullevålsveien 68, N-0454 Oslo*

*-Small-scale production of autogenous vaccines against various infections in animals.*

#### ***The Norwegian Institute of Public Health***

*Postboks 4404 Nydalen, N-0403*

*-Have ready vaccine production facilities. Possible future areas of production is influenza vaccine, and vaccine against Neisseria meningitidis group B infection.*

*This list of vaccine production facilities has been unchanged for the last eight years.*