

Revised forms for the submission of the Confidence-Building Measures

Declaration form on Nothing to Declare or Nothing New to Declare for use in the information exchange

Measure	Nothing to declare	Nothing new to declare	Year of last declaration if nothing new to declare
A, part 1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(Please mark the appropriate box(es) for each measure with a tick, and fill in the year of last declaration in the last column where applicable.)

Date: April 15th 2019 _____

State Party to the Convention: Finland _____

Date of ratification/accession to the Convention: February 4, 1974 _____

National point of contact: Antti Vaaras / MFA _____

Confidence-Building Measure "A"

Form A, part 1 (i)

No maximum containment laboratory exists in Finland.

Form A, part 1 (ii)

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents¹ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3 ²	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> yes / no
Biosafety level 2 ³ (if applicable)	yes / no

Any additional relevant information as appropriate:

Additional information specific to each laboratory working with biological agents at BSL2/BSL3 level follows from these organisations: Centre for Biothreat Preparedness, National Institute of Health and Welfare (THL), University of Helsinki; *i*) Yersinia Research Laboratory, *ii*) Department of Virology, *iii*) Department of Food and Environmental Sciences, *iv*) *Clostridium botulinum* laboratory, Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira) and Finnish Defence Research Agency (FDRA).

Exchange of Data on Research Centres and Laboratories #1

¹ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

² In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

³ In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

1. Name(s) of the Facility

Centre for Biothreat Preparedness

2. Responsible public or private organization or company

Centre for Military Medicine, Finnish Defence Forces under the Ministry of Defence and the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) under Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.

3. Location and postal address

Tukholmankatu 8 A, FI-00290 Helsinki and Mannerheimintie 166, FI-00300 Helsinki.

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

The Centre for Biothreat Preparedness is financed jointly by the Finnish Defence Forces and National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL).

5. Number of maximum containment units within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m²)

There are no BSL-4 units at the Centre for Biothreat Preparedness.

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

The Centre for Biothreat Preparedness started its activities in 2005. During 2018, the Centre developed rapid detection assays for selected microbial agents.

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents⁴ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3	yes
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⁴ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

Exchange of Data on Research Centres and Laboratories #2

1. Name(s) of the Facility

Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira)

2. Responsible public or private organization or company

Finnish Food Safety Authority under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

3. Location and postal address

Mustialankatu 3
FI-00790 Helsinki

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Financing from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

5. Number of maximum containment units within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m²)

None

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

Diagnostics, surveillance and reference laboratory activities of animal diseases, zoonotic agents and foodborne pathogens, for example rabies, avian influenza, swine influenza (including pandemic H1N1 in pigs), Newcastle disease, foot and mouth disease, classical swine fever, anthrax, tuberculosis, verotoxic *E. coli*.

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents¹ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3	yes
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¹ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

Exchange of Data on Research Centres and Laboratories #3

1. Name(s) of the Facility

Finnish Defence Research Agency (FDRA)

2. Responsible public or private organization or company

Finnish Defence Research Agency (FDRA), Finnish Defence Forces under the Ministry of Defence.

3. Location and postal address

P.O. Box 5 (Paroistentie 20)

FI-34111 Lakiala

Finland

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Finnish Defence Forces

5. Number of maximum containment units within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m2)

No BSL-4 laboratories.

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

The objective of the research work has been in the development of detection and identification methods for biological warfare agents; microbes and toxins. A deployable CBRN field laboratory participated in international military exercises. The BSL-3 level CBRN field laboratory was operated as BSL-2 and BSL-3 containment facility during 2018.

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents¹ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3	yes
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¹ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

Exchange of Data on Research Centres and Laboratories #4

1. Name(s) of the Facility

National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), bacteriological and virological laboratories.

2. Responsible public or private organization or company

National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) under Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.

3. Location and postal address

Mannerheimintie 166, FI-00300 Helsinki

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Funding from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and large variety of external research funding.

5. Number of maximum containment units within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m²)

There are no BSL-4 laboratories or other units at this containment level.

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

Clinical and environmental microbiological research and reference laboratory facilities in Helsinki, and Kuopio. The institute is working mainly with ordinary occurring endemic and epidemic bacteria and viruses with main emphases on vaccine preventable diseases, enteric pathogens, zoonoses, *tuberculosis spp*, polioviruses, avian influenza, coronaviruses, zikavirus, HIV, hepatitis viruses and environmental fungi and bacteria causing human health problems. The Institute manages regional influenza and polio laboratory facilities. The Institute is in charge of biothreat preparedness in public health context. National focal point for IHR started June 2007.

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents¹ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3	yes
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Any additional relevant information as appropriate:

A BSL-3 level laboratory in Helsinki (120m²).

¹ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

Exchange of Data on Research Centres and Laboratories #5

1. Name(s) of the Facility

Clostridium botulinum laboratory

2. Responsible public or private organization or company

Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, University of Helsinki, Finland

3. Location and postal address

Location

Agnes Sjöbergin katu 2

00790 Helsinki, Finland

Postal address

P.O. Box 66

00014 University of Helsinki, Finland

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

The laboratory is financed by the University of Helsinki. External research funding is received from various sources, including European Research Council, European Commission, Academy of Finland, Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Walter Ehrström Foundation, Finnish Foundation for Veterinary Research, and Finnish food industry.

5. Number of maximum containment units within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m2)

No BSL-4 laboratories.

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

Academic scientific research on the prevalence, epidemiology, genetic heterogeneity, and genetic regulatory mechanisms in *Clostridium botulinum*. Diagnostic services for confirmation of suspected human botulism outbreaks and food safety testing.

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents¹ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3	no
Biosafety level 2 (if applicable)	yes

¹ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

Exchange of Data on Research Centres and Laboratories #6:

1. Name(s) of the research centre and/or laboratory

Department of Virology, Viral Zoonoses Group

2. Responsible public or private organization or company

University of Helsinki

3. Location and postal address

Dept of Virology
Medicum, P.O. Box 21
00014 University of Helsinki

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Major funding from Jane and Aatos Erkko Foundation, Helsinki University Hospital Funds (EVO), University of Helsinki, Academy of Finland, and Sigrid Jusélius Foundation.

5. Number of maximum containment units within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size m2)

There are no BSL-4 laboratories.

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

The Helsinki University Viral Zoonoses Group (HUVZG) conducts research on virology, cell biology, ecology and epidemiology of zoonotic viruses, especially hantaviruses and certain other rodent-borne and arboviruses occurring in Northern Europe. Typical viruses that we are growing are Puumala virus, tick-borne encephalitis virus, dengue and Zika viruses. The research group operates within the Faculty of Medicine, Department of Virology, and partially the Department of Veterinary Biosciences at the Veterinary Faculty. In a joint project with University of Nairobi, we are studying bats, rodents, arthropods and human samples from Kenya. There is a BSL-3 facility in both Viikki campus (faculty of Veterinary Medicine) and Meilahti campus (run by HUSLAB where our group rents one room). The Viral Zoonoses group is connected to the diagnostic laboratory of viral zoonoses at HUSLAB, Helsinki. The group is led by Olli Vapalahti, other principal investigators are Alexander Plyusnin, and professor Emeritus Antti Vaheri.

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents¹ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3	yes
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¹ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

Exchange of Data on Research Centres and Laboratories #7

1. Name(s) of the Facility

Yersinia Research Laboratory

2. Responsible public or private organization or company

University of Helsinki

3. Location and postal address

Department of Bacteriology and Immunology

Medicum, University of Helsinki

Haartmaninkatu 3

P.O Box 21

FI-00014 University of Helsinki

Helsinki, Finland

Yersinia-research home page: <https://www.helsinki.fi/en/researchgroups/yersinia-and-bacteriophage-research-laboratory>

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Special state subsidy (EVO) for health science research in Finland, the Academy of Finland, Jane and Aatos Erkko Foundation.

5. Number of maximum containment units within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m²)

No BSL-3 or 4 laboratories.

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

The research is focused on genetics and biosynthesis of lipopolysaccharide (LPS) of *Yersinia pestis*, as well as on the role of LPS in virulence. Molecular evolution studies elucidate the relationships between the species of the genus *Yersinia*. Research work is also conducted on the identification of *Y. pestis* specific bacteriophage receptors.

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents¹ on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3	no
Biosafety level 2 (if applicable)	yes

¹ Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

Part 2 Exchange of information on national biological defence research and development programmes

Form A, part 2 (i)

National biological defence research and development programmes Declaration

Are there any national programmes to conduct biological defence research and development within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or control anywhere? Activities of such programmes would include prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxicology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

yes / no

If the answer is Yes, complete Form A, part 2 (ii) which will provide a description of each programme.

Form A, part 2 (ii, iii)

National biological defence research and development programmes

The Finnish Security Strategy for Society has defined vital functions of Finnish society and established targets and development policies that guide each administrative branch of the government in dealing with its strategic tasks since 2003. These strategies (2010, 2017) called for co-operation between each government sector in combating against new threats towards society and outline the general principles for preparedness in Finland. According to the Government Reports on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2016, Finland promotes the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as associated hazardous materials and know-how. Terrorism, epidemics and pandemics are also considered as security threats. The Government's Defence Report 2017 also recognizes CBRN threats. In addition, CBRN protection including biotechnology and engineering have been listed critical for the national defence in Securing the Finnish Defence Technological and Industrial Base –resolution (2016).

The Centre for Biothreat Preparedness started operations in Helsinki in 2005. The Centre combines Finnish scientific and laboratory knowhow on biological defence, as well as on biothreat assessment and preparedness. The Centre has actively sought domestic and international collaboration, especially in the field of rapid detection and identification methodologies of selected biological agents. The Centre combines Finnish scientific and laboratory know-how on biological defence, as well as on biothreat assessment and preparedness between the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) and the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) under guidance of the respective ministries. In line with the One Health approach, in 2019 the Finnish Food Authority under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry joined BUOS, as recommended by the 2017 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of Finland. Scientific work is carried out at a biological safety level 3 laboratories. In addition, the Centre functions within the Biomedicum Helsinki Institute, where work is carried out in close contact with the Research and Development Department of the Centre for Military Medicine.

Confidence-Building Measure "B"

Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins

Form B

Information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern⁵

No unusual human or animal disease outbreaks were detected in 2018.

⁵ See paragraph 2 of the chapeau to Confidence-Building Measure B.

Confidence-Building Measure "C"

Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge

Selected publications and references in 2018

Ying-xia He, Cheng-lin Ye, Pei Zhang, Qiao Li, Chae Gyu Park, Kun Yang, Ling-yu Jiang, Yin Lv, Xiao-ling Ying, Honghui Ding, Hong-ping Huang, John Tembo, An-yi Li, Bing Cheng, Shu-sheng Zhang, Guoxing Zheng, Shiyun Chen, Wei LI, Lianxu Xia, Biao Kan, Xin Wang, Huaiqi Jing, Ruifu Yang, Hua Peng, Yang-Xin Fu, John Klena, Mikael Skurnik, and Tie Chen. 2018. *Yersinia pseudotuberculosis* exploits CD209 receptors for promoting host dissemination and infection. *Infection and Immunity* Dec 2018, 87 (1) e00654-18; DOI: 10.1128/IAI.00654-18.

Bozcal, E., Eldem, V., Aydemir, S., and Skurnik, M. The relationship between phylogenetic classification, virulence and antibiotic resistance of extraintestinal pathogenic *Escherichia coli* in Izmir province, Turkey. *PeerJ* 6:e5470; DOI 10.7717/peerj.5470.

Kiljunen, S., Wicklund, A, and Skurnik, M. 2018. Complete genome sequences of two *Escherichia* phages isolated from wastewater in Finland. *Genome Announcements*, 6:e00401-18.

Salem, M and Skurnik, M. 2018. Genomic Characterization of Sixteen *Yersinia enterocolitica*-Infecting Podoviruses of P1g Origin. *Viruses* 10, 174; doi:10.3390/v10040174.

Jun, JW, Park, SC, Wicklund, A, Skurnik, M. 2018. Bacteriophages reduce *Yersinia enterocolitica* contamination of food and kitchenware. *Int J Food Microbiology* 271: 33-47.

Westenius V, Mäkelä SM, Julkunen I, Österlund P. Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A virus spreads efficiently in human primary monocyte-derived macrophages and dendritic cells. *Front Immunol*, 2018; doi: 10.3389/fimmu.2018.01664.

Jiang M, Österlund P, Westenius V, Guo D, Poranen M, Bamford DH, Julkunen I. Efficient inhibition of avian and seasonal influenza A viruses by a virus-specific Dicer-substrate siRNA swarm in human monocyte-derived macrophages and dendritic cells. *J Virol*, 2018, doi: 10.1128/JVI.01916-18.

Lienemann,T.,Beyer,W., Pelkola,K., Rossow,H., Rehn,A., Antwerpen,M., Grass,G. Genotyping and phylogenetic placement of *Bacillus anthracis* isolates from Finland, a country with rare anthrax cases. *BMC Microbiology* 2018; Vol.18, No.102.

Levanov L, Iheozor-Ejiofor RP, Lundkvist Å, Vapalahti O, Plyusnin A. Defining of MAbs-neutralizing sites on the surface glycoproteins Gn and Gc of a hantavirus using vesicular stomatitis virus pseudotypes and site-directed mutagenesis. *J Gen Virol*. 2019 Feb;100(2):145-155. doi: 10.1099/jgv.0.001202. Epub 2019 Jan 9.

Jansen S, Heitmann A, Lühken R, Jöst H, Helms M, Vapalahti O, Schmidt-Chanasit J, Tannich E. Experimental transmission of Zika virus by *Aedes japonicus japonicus* from southwestern Germany. *Emerg Microbes Infect*. 2018 Nov 28;7(1):192. doi: 10.1038/s41426-018-0195-x.

Jääskeläinen AJ, Korhonen EM, Huhtamo E, Lappalainen M, Vapalahti O, Kallio-Kokko H. Validation of serological and molecular methods for diagnosis of zika virus infections. *J Virol Methods*. 2019 Jan;263:68-74. doi: 10.1016/j.jviromet.2018.10.011. Epub 2018 Oct 18.

Stanelle-Bertram S, Walendy-Gnirß K, Speiseder T, Thiele S, Asante IA, Dreier C, Kouassi NM, Preuß A, Pilnitz-Stolze G, Müller U, Thanisch S, Richter M, Scharrenberg R, Kraus V, Dörk R, Schau L, Herder V, Gerhauser I, Pfankuche VM, Käufer C, Walzl I, Moraes T, Sellau J, Hoenow S, Schmidt-Chanasit J, Jansen S, Schattling B, Ittrich H, Bartsch U, Renné T, Bartenschlager R, Arck P, Cadar D, Friese MA, Vapalahti O, Lotter H, Benites S, Rolling L, Gabriel M, Baumgärtner W, Morellini F, Hölter SM, Amarie O, Fuchs H, Hrabe de Angelis M, Löscher W, Calderon de Anda F, Gabriel G. Male offspring born to mildly ZIKV-infected mice are at risk of developing neurocognitive disorders in adulthood. *Nat Microbiol.* 2018 Oct;3(10):1161-1174. doi: 10.1038/s41564-018-0236-1. Epub 2018 Sep 10.

Müller JA, Harms M, Krüger F, Groß R, Joas S, Hayn M, Dietz AN, Lippold S, von Einem J, Schubert A, Michel M, Mayer B, Cortese M, Jang KS, Sandi-Monroy N, Deniz M, Ebner F, Vapalahti O, Otto M, Bartenschlager R, Herbeuval JP, Schmidt-Chanasit J, Roan NR, Münch J. Semen inhibits Zika virus infection of cells and tissues from the anogenital region. *Nat Commun.* 2018 Jun 7;9(1):2207. doi: 10.1038/s41467-018-04442-y.

Ianevski A, Zusinaite E, Kuivanen S, Strand M, Lysvand H, Teppor M, Kakkola L, Paavilainen H, Laajala M, Kallio-Kokko H, Valkonen M, Kantele A, Telling K, Lutsar I, Letjuka P, Metelitsa N, Oksenysh V, Bjørås M, Nordbø SA, Dumpis U, Vitkauskiene A, Öhrmalm C, Bondeson K, Bergqvist A, Aittokallio T, Cox RJ, Evander M, Hukkanen V, Marjomaki V, Julkunen I, Vapalahti O, Tenson T, Merits A, Kainov D. Novel activities of safe-in-human broad-spectrum antiviral agents. *Antiviral Res.* 2018 Jun;154:174-182. doi: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2018.04.016. Epub 2018 Apr 23.

Kuivanen S, Smura T, Rantanen K, Kämppi L, Kantonen J, Kero M, Jääskeläinen A, Jääskeläinen AJ, Sane J, Myllykangas L, Paetau A, Vapalahti O. Fatal Tick-Borne Encephalitis Virus Infections Caused by Siberian and European Subtypes, Finland, 2015. *Emerg Infect Dis.* 2018 May;24(5):946-948. doi: 10.3201/eid2405.171986.

Röcker AE, Müller JA, Dietzel E, Harms M, Krüger F, Heid C, Sowislok A, Riber CF, Kupke A, Lippold S, von Einem J, Beer J, Knöll B, Becker S, Schmidt-Chanasit J, Otto M, Vapalahti O, Zelikin AN, Bitan G, Schrader T, Münch J. The molecular tweezer CLR01 inhibits Ebola and Zika virus infection. *Antiviral Res.* 2018 Apr;152:26-35. doi: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2018.02.003. Epub 2018 Feb 8.

Polat C, Sironen T, Plyusnina A, Karatas A, Sozen M, Matur F, Vapalahti O, Oktem IMA, Plyusnin A. Dobrava hantavirus variants found in *Apodemus flavicollis* mice in Kırklareli Province, Turkey. *J Med Virol.* 2018 May;90(5):810-818. doi: 10.1002/jmv.25036. Epub 2018 Feb 13.

Forbes KM, Webala P, Jääskeläinen AJ, Abdurahman S, Ogola J, Masika MM, Kivistö I, Alburkat H, Plyusnin I, Levanov L, Korhonen E, Huhtamo E, Mwaengo D, Smura T, Mirazimi A, Anzala O, Vapalahti O, Sironen T. Bombali Ebola Virus in *Mops condylurus* Bat, Kenya. *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, in press.

Confidence-Building Measure "E"

Form E

Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

Relating to	Legislation	Regulations	Other measures ⁶	Amended since last year
(a) Development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
(b) Exports of micro-organisms ⁷ and toxins	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
(c) Imports of micro-organisms ¹¹ and toxins	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input type="checkbox"/> No
(d) Biosafety ⁸ and biosecurity ⁹	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	Yes/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No

Additional information to form E

Finland's legislation on biological weapons is based on the Biological Weapons Act 257/1975 and Decree 258/1975. Corresponding penal provisions were included in the Penal Code, chapter 11, section 7 b (Breach of the prohibition of biological weapons), with amendment 17/2003. Penal Code (39/1889) chapter 11, section 1 (War Crime), chapter 5, section 3 (Complicity in an offence) and section 6 (Abetting), chapter 34, sections 4 (Health endangerment) and 5 (Aggravated health endangerment), and chapter 34 a (Terrorist offences) are also applicable.

⁶ Including guidelines.

⁷ Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the Convention.

⁸ In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual or equivalent national or international guidance.

⁹ In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance or equivalent national or international guidance.

Exports of micro-organisms and toxins are regulated by the Act on the Control of Export of Dual-Use Goods (562/1996, as amended by Acts 891/2000, 884/2001 and 581/2003), Government Decree on the Control of Export of Dual-Use Goods (924/2000 as amended by Decree 924/2000) and EC Council Regulation 1334/2000. Corresponding penal provisions were incorporated in the Penal Code (39/1889), chapter 46, sections 1-3 by Acts 769/1990, 1522/1994 and 706/1997. Since 2003, the authority responsible for export controls of micro-organisms and toxins is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Export Control Unit).

Exports of biological toxic agents "adapted for use in war" and related equipment, components and materials as listed in the EU Common Military List are regulated by the Act on the Export of Defence Materiel (282/2012). The authority responsible for export controls of the above mentioned biological toxic agents and related equipment, component and materials is the Ministry of Defence.

Imports of micro-organisms and toxins are regulated by the Biological Weapons Act 257/1975 and Decree 258/1975. Transports of micro-organisms and toxins are also regulated by the EC Council Directives 94/55/EEC and 96/49/EEC, the Infectious Diseases Act 1227/2016, section 87; Act on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (719/1994 as amended) and related decrees, Act on Protecting Plant Health (702/2003), section 7, and related decrees, Act on Animal Diseases (441/2013), section 63 and related decrees, Act on Veterinary Border Control (1192/1996 as amended) and related decrees. The corresponding penal provisions are included in the Penal Code (39/1889 as amended), chapter 44, section 2 (Health protection violation), chapter 44, section 13 (Transport of dangerous substances offence) and chapter 46, section 4 (Smuggling).

Biosafety is regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (738/2002), as amended by the Government Decision for Protecting Employees from Work-related Threat Caused by Biological Agents (1155/1993), and Decision of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on the Classification of Biological Agents (921/2010). Furthermore, regulations concerning biosafety are included in the Communicable Diseases Act (1227/2016) and Decree (146/2017), as well as Gene Technology Act (377/1995) and Government Decree on Gene Technology (928/2004). These biosafety regulations partly overlap with biosecurity; no specific biosecurity legislation exists.

Confidence-Building Measure "F"

Form F

Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

Nothing to declare.

Confidence-Building Measure "G"

Form G

Declaration of vaccine production facilities

There are no vaccine production facilities in Finland.