

# Notification of Confidence Building Measures under BTWC by Denmark, April 2007

## **Confidence-building measure A**

### Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories.

See the following sections.

### Part 2: Exchange information on national biological defence research and development programmes.

Form A, part 2 (i)

Denmark has a national programme dedicated to conducting research within biological defence.

Form A, part 2 (ii)

1: The Danish National Center for Biological Defence conducts a biological defensive program funded by the Danish Government. The Centre operates as a department at the State Serum Institute, which reports to the Ministry of Interior and Health.

The objectives of the research programmes include development (or improvement when applicable) of risk and threat assessments, biosecurity, disease surveillance, dispersal assessments, pathogenicity and virulence, sampling techniques, diagnostic techniques, forensic procedures, physical protection and decontamination.

2: The funding is strictly public and amounts to 14 million Danish crowns annually from the Danish Government. Additional funds are provided through framework programmes of the European Union.

3: No.

4-7: Not applicable.

## **Confidence-building measure B**

Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins.

Denmark encourages nations to provide information on the occurrence endemically as well as in relation to possible epidemics of biological warfare relevant agents. Consequently, Danish cases of francisella are summarised below.

Form B (i)

2003, one case of francisella tularensis.

2004, one case of francisella tularensis.

2005, two cases of francisella tularensis.

2006, three cases of francisella tularensis.

2006, nine cases of brucellosis.

#### Form B (ii)

In a 15-year time-frame, spanning the years 1987-2002, eight cases of franciesella were recorded. Five of these cases were by environmental exposure, while three cases were believed to have been caused by occupational exposure. Since 2003 a small number of patients have been diagnosed annually with Francisella tularensis. Locations have been scattered across the country, with perhaps a small clustering on the island of Bornholm. However, numbers are probably too few to draw any firm conclusions on prediliction of location and source.

Previously, this disease has been rarely diagnosed and the new epidemiological findings thus denote an event that seems to deviate from the normal pattern. It is unknown at present, however, whether the increased number of reported cases reflects a true rise in incidence or is conceivably based on improved diagnostics in conjunction with an increased clinical awareness.

In 2006, nine cases of brucellosis were identified by serological testing. Seven persons were found to be positive for *B. abortus* and two persons for *B. melitensis*. Information about travel history (Taiwan and Poland) was available in one case with *B. abortus*. Furthermore, two cases were found positive for Yersinia O9, known to cross-react with *Brucella spp.* No clinical data were available for these.

#### **Confidence-building measure C**

Denmark encourages publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, provided it is in compliance with good biosecurity practice.

In the annual report of 2007 Denmark draws the attention to the following publications:

Biosecurity in Scandinavia. Kristian H. Bork, Vibeke Halkjaer-Knudsen, John-Erik Stig Hansen, Erik D. Heegaard. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science Apr 2007, Vol. 5, No. 1: 62-71.

Biological Incident Response and Environmental Sampling – a European Guideline on Principles of Field Investigation. EU Commision DG Health and Consumer Protection, Health Threats Unit, 2006.

[http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph\\_threats/com/preparedness/docs/biological.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/preparedness/docs/biological.pdf)

#### **Confidence-building measure D**

Active promotion of contacts.

Denmark has hosted international conferences and workshops in areas related to the Convention, including:

- 1: Biotect 2006. A workshop and field exercise, BIOTECT 2006, on Incident Response and Environmental sampling was held in Denmark. The workshop was arranged on

behalf of the EU commission and attracted more than 80 participants from 16 Member States of the European Union.

2: EU Biopreparedness and Research. The Danish National Center for Biological Defence hosted this conference on biopreparedness in January 2007 which had several high-level speakers from The EU-Commission, research institutions and preparedness organisations.

### **Confidence-building measure E**

Declaration of legislation, regulation and other measures.

Form E

A: The relevant Danish legislation is covered by the Penal Code, Weapons Act and War Equipment Act, which in concert prohibits the possession of assembled biological weapons and selected conventional delivery devices such as grenades, mortars and other traditional means of dispersal.

Notably, the national control and physical protection of biological materials are mainly regulated by various laws dealing with safety issues.

Denmark is currently considering a judicial platform or administrative enforcement to prohibit, investigate or certify the acquisition, possession, development, production, manipulation, retention or stockpiling by private companies, public institutions or private entities, of any type of biological agent, provided that these agents are handled safely in terms of accidental environmental or occupational exposure. Additionally precursors, relevant equipment and know-how for the production and improvised dispersal of biological warfare agents, as well as field testing of systems, and the exchange and publication of procedures and methods pertaining to these issues, are also under consideration.

B: Denmark has export regulations which adhere to the lists provided by the European Union and Australia Group. The system relies on self-reporting.

C: As described under item B.

### **Confidence-building measure F**

Form F

Denmark has since 2001 maintained and expanded an ongoing national capability within defensive biological research and development. For summary of research and development activities please refer to Part 2: Exchange information on national biological defence research and development programmes, described in the section termed Confidence-building measure A.

### **Confidence-building measure G**

Form G

Declaration of governmental vaccine production facilities for the protection of humans:

Statens Serum Institute

Artillerivej 5

2300 Copenhagen S.

Denmark

Vaccines include polio vaccine, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis and tuberculosis.

Declaration of corporate vaccine production facilities for the protection of humans:

Bavarian Nordic A/S

Bøgeskovvej 9

3490 Kvistgård

Denmark

Vaccine production includes smallpox vaccine (Modified Vaccinia Ankara). Manufacturing capability amounts to the production of 40 million doses annually.