

## Annex I

### Revised forms for the submission of the Confidence-Building Measures

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that all States Parties present the following declaration, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

#### Declaration form on Nothing to Declare or Nothing New to Declare for use in the information exchange

Measure	Nothing to declare	Nothing new to declare	Year of last declaration if nothing new to declare
A, part 1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2012
F	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(Please mark the appropriate box(es) for each measure with a tick, and fill in the year of last declaration in the last column where applicable.)

Date: *15 April 2013*

State Party to the Convention: *Republic of Latvia*

Date of ratification/accession to the Convention: *06.02.1997*

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## **Active promotion of contacts**

The Third Review Conference agreed that States parties continue to implement the following:

"Active promotion of contacts between scientists, other experts and facilities engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges and visits for joint research on a mutually agreed basis."

In order to actively promote professional contacts between scientists, joint research projects and other activities aimed at preventing or reducing the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and at improving international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, the Seventh Review Conference encouraged States parties to share forward looking information, to the extent possible,

- on planned international conferences, seminars, symposia and similar events dealing with biological research directly related to the Convention, and
- on other opportunities for exchange of scientists, joint research or other measures to promote contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention,

including through the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

# Confidence-Building Measure "A"

## Part 1

### Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to implement the following:

"Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention."

#### Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

Data should be provided by States Parties on each facility, within their territory or under their jurisdiction or control anywhere, which has any maximum containment laboratories meeting those criteria for such maximum containment laboratories as specified in the latest edition of the WHO<sup>1</sup> Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or OIE<sup>2</sup> Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent guidelines adopted by relevant international organisations, such as those designated as biosafety level 4 (BL4, BSL4 or P4) or equivalent standards.

States Parties that do not possess a facility meeting criteria for such maximum containment should continue to Form A, part 1 (ii).

### Form A, part 1 (i)

*Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories*<sup>3</sup>

1. Name(s) of facility<sup>4</sup>

*Riga East University Hospital, Latvian Centre of Infectious Diseases, National Microbiology Reference Laboratory*

2. Responsible public or private \_\_\_\_\_  
organization or company \_\_\_\_\_

3. Location and postal address

*3, Linezera Street, LV-1006, Riga, Latvia*

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

*State budget (under the supervision of the Ministry of Health)*

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<sup>1</sup> World Health Organization

<sup>2</sup> World Organization for Animal Health

<sup>3</sup> The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.

<sup>4</sup> For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".

5. Number of maximum containment units<sup>5</sup> within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m<sup>2</sup>)

*Maximum containment unit is Containment level 3 (BSL-3)*

*BSL-3 laboratory rooms have total size of 156, 60 m<sup>2</sup>*

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

*National Microbiology Reference Laboratory is providing reference diagnostics of infectious diseases, including rare and dangerous risk group 3 pathogens; reference materials supplying; scientific advice; participating in research programmes and networks; monitoring alerts and providing preparedness with 24/7 response. According to the epidemiological situation and diagnostic needs laboratory is ready to perform "classical" new emerging pathogen detection and characterisation. For the preparedness needs laboratory satisfies investigation needs for group A and B potential bioterrorism pathogen detection.*

*List of pathogens: Botulism, Brucellosis, Campylobacteriosis, Chlamydia infections, Cholera, Cryptosporidiosis, Diphtheria, Echinococcosis, Giardiasis, Gonococcal infections, Haemophilus influenza, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, HIV-infection, Influenza, Legionellosis, Leptospirosis, Listeriosis, Malaria, Measles, Meningococcal disease, Mumps, Nosocomial infections, Pathogenic, E.coli, Pertussis, Plague, Pneumococcal infections, Poliomyelitis, Rabies, Rubella, Salmonellosis, Shigellosis, Spongiform encephalopathies, Syphilis, Toxoplasmosis, Trichinosis, Tuberculosis, Viral haemorrhagic fevers, Yersinosis (incl. Y.pestis), Adenovirus, Bacillus anthracis, Chikungunya, CMV, Francisella tularensis, Hantavirus, Hepatitis D, Hepatitis E, HPV, Norovirus, SARS, Staphylococcus/MRSA, Tularemia, West Nile virus, Dengue, Coxiella burnetti, TBE, Borrelia burgdorferi, Rickettsia, Mycoplasmae, Ehrlichiosis, Yellow fever virus, Japanese encephalitis virus, Crimean-Congo fever, Sandfly fever virus, Rift Valley virus, Parvovirus B19, and others.*

*Standards: Laboratory is working according to ISO 15189 and ISO 17025 standards requirements. ISO 15190 standards requirements are also implemented. The hazards are identified and documented in the Biosafety Manual Actual Edition as documents describing Hazard Microorganism classification, Room and facilities classification, PPE usage, Utilization and safe waste management etc. Laboratory continuously carries out internal audits in Biosafety and Biosecurity provision system. Laboratory is audited by National accreditation body LATAK (Latvian National Accreditation Bureau), according to LVS EN ISO 15189 and LVS EN ISO 17025 standard, which is required every year.*

*Training: Laboratory personnel involved in work with pathogens are well trained due to continuous training programs within the laboratory. All personnel undergo training before starting to work in laboratory and confirm their skills during trainings at least once a year. Trainings are organized and supervised by the Vice director in laboratory affairs, the laboratory biosafety officer, the Quality assurance manager, as well as by the Heads of departments. Staff which is responsible for training of employees who are involved in BSL3 (CL3) suite has been trained in the Health Protection Agency BSL-3/4 laboratory (UK), Robert Koch Institute (Germany) and "Biorisk Management Advanced Trainer Programme" by the World Health Organisation.*

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<sup>5</sup> In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, or equivalent.

## Form A, part 1 (ii)

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents<sup>6</sup> on a State Party's territory:

*As mentioned above – CL3 (BSL-3) laboratory rooms with Dangerous Infectious Diseases Diagnostic Division in its structure.*

*Laboratory performs rare, dangerous and emerging diseases diagnostic – including potential Bioterrorism agents detection.*

Biosafety level 3 <sup>7</sup>	<u>yes</u> / no
Biosafety level 2 <sup>8</sup> (if applicable)	<u>yes</u> / no

Any additional relevant information as appropriate:

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## Part 2

### Exchange of information on national biological defence research and development programmes

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties are to implement the following:

In the interest of increasing the transparency of national research and development programmes on biological defence, the States Parties will declare whether or not they conduct such programmes. States Parties agreed to provide, annually, detailed information on their biological defence research and development programmes including summaries of the objectives and costs of effort performed by contractors and in other facilities. If no biological defence research and development programme is being conducted, a null report will be provided.

States Parties will make declarations in accordance with the attached forms, which require the following information:

- (1) The objective and summary of the research and development activities under way indicating whether work is conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research;
- (2) Whether contractor or other non-defence facilities are utilized and the total funding provided to that portion of the programme;
- (3) The organizational structure of the programme and its reporting relationships; and
- (4) The following information concerning the defence and other governmental facilities in which the biological defence research and development programme is concentrated;

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<sup>6</sup> Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

<sup>7</sup> In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

<sup>8</sup> In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

- (a) location;
- (b) the floor areas (sqM) of the facilities including that dedicated to each of BL2, BL3 and BL4 level laboratories;
- (c) the total number of staff employed, including those contracted full time for more than six months;
- (d) numbers of staff reported in (c) by the following categories: civilian, military, scientists, technicians, engineers, support and administrative staff;
- (e) a list of the scientific disciplines of the scientific/engineering staff;
- (f) the source and funding levels in the following three areas: research, development, and test and evaluation; and
- (g) the policy regarding publication and a list of publicly-available papers and reports.

## Form A, part 2 (i)

### National biological defence research and development programmes Declaration

Are there any national programmes to conduct biological defence research and development within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or control anywhere? Activities of such programmes would include prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

Yes/No

If the answer is Yes, complete Form A, part 2 (ii) which will provide a description of each programme.

## Form A, part 2 (ii)

### National biological defence research and development programmes

#### Description

1. State the objectives and funding of each programme and summarize the principal research and development activities conducted in the programme. Areas to be addressed shall include: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

*Riga East University Hospital Latvian Centre of Infectious Diseases National Microbiology Reference Laboratory performs rare, dangerous and emerging diseases diagnostic – including potential Bioterrorism agents detection.*

*Laboratory is responsible for performing laboratory investigation of potential bioterrorism agents, receiving environmental and human samples in cases of emergency situations according to the Republic of Latvia Cabinet of Ministers Instruction Nr.12 (05.08.2008) “Instructions Regarding Actions of Responsible Institutions in the Event of Finding a Substance or Object of Unknown Origin if it is Suspected that It Contains Explosive, Radioactive, Dangerous Chemical or Biological Substances, as well as if Indications of Terrorist Attack are Detected”.*

2. State the total funding for each programme and its source.

3. Are aspects of these programmes conducted under contract with industry, academic institutions, or in other non-defence facilities?

**Yes/No**

4. If yes, what proportion of the total funds for each programme is expended in these contracted or other facilities?

5. Summarize the objectives and research areas of each programme performed by contractors and in other facilities with the funds identified under paragraph 4.

6. Provide a diagram of the organizational structure of each programme and the reporting relationships (include individual facilities participating in the programme).

7. Provide a declaration in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii) for each facility, both governmental and non-governmental, which has a substantial proportion of its resources devoted to each national biological defence research and development programme, within the territory of the reporting State, or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere.

## **Form A, part 2 (iii)**

### **National biological defence research and development programmes**

#### **Facilities**

Complete a form for each facility declared in accordance with paragraph 7 in Form A, part 2 (ii).

In shared facilities, provide the following information for the biological defence research and development portion only.

1. What is the name of the facility?

*Riga East University Hospital; Latvian Centre of Infectious Diseases; National Microbiology Reference Laboratory*

2. Where is it located (include both address and geographical location)?

*3, Linezera Street, LV-1006, Riga, Latvia*

3. Floor area of laboratory areas by containment level:

*BL2 2337.90 m2 (sqM)*

*BL3 156, 60 m2 (sqM)*

BL4 \_\_\_\_\_ (sqM)

Total laboratory floor area *2494, 50 m2 (sqM)*

4. The organizational structure of each facility.

(i) Total number of personnel *109*

(ii) Division of personnel:

Military *0*

Civilian *109*

(iii) Division of personnel by category:

Scientists *46*

Engineers *1*

Technicians *41*

Administrative and support staff *21*

(iv) List the scientific disciplines represented in the scientific/engineering staff.

*Bacteriology, including mycology;*

*Virology;*

*Parasitology;*

*Molecular biology;*

*Serology;*

*Rare, dangerous, Emerging and Bioterrorism pathogens unit*

(v) Are contractor staff working in the facility? If so, provide an approximate number.

*No*

(vi) What is (are) the source(s) of funding for the work conducted in the facility, including indication if activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence?

*State budget (under the supervision of the Ministry of Health)*

(vii) What are the funding levels for the following programme areas:

Research \_\_\_\_\_

Development \_\_\_\_\_

Test and evaluation \_\_\_\_\_

(viii) Briefly describe the publication policy of the facility

(ix) Provide a list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work published during the previous 12 months. (To include authors, titles and full references.)

5. Briefly describe the biological defence work carried out at the facility, including type(s) of micro-organisms<sup>9</sup> and/or toxins studied, as well as outdoor studies of biological aerosols.

## **Confidence-Building Measure "B"**

### **Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins**

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to implement the following:

Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins, and on all such events that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. The information provided on events that deviate from the norm will include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases.

The Seventh Review Conference agreed the following:

No universal standards exist for what might constitute a deviation from the normal pattern.

#### **Modalities**

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

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<sup>9</sup> Including viruses and prions.



1. Exchange of data on outbreaks that seem to deviate from the normal pattern is considered particularly important in the following cases:

- When the cause of the outbreak cannot be readily determined or the causative agent<sup>10</sup> is difficult to diagnose,
- When the disease may be caused by organisms which meet the criteria for risk groups III or IV, according to the classification in the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual,
- When the causative agent is exotic to a given geographical region,
- When the disease follows an unusual pattern of development,
- When the disease occurs in the vicinity of research centres and laboratories subject to exchange of data under item A,
- When suspicions arise of the possible occurrence of a new disease.

2. In order to enhance confidence, an initial report of an outbreak of an infectious disease or a similar occurrence that seems to deviate from the normal pattern should be given promptly after cognizance of the outbreak and should be followed up by annual reports. To enable States Parties to follow a standardized procedure, the Conference has agreed that Form B should be used, to the extent information is known and/or applicable, for the exchange of annual information.

3. The declaration of electronic links to national websites or to websites of international, regional or other organizations which provide information on disease outbreaks (notably outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern) may also satisfy the declaration requirement under Form B.

4. In order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities and in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, States Parties are encouraged to invite experts from other States Parties to assist in the handling of an outbreak, and to respond favourably to such invitations, respecting applicable national legislation and relevant international instruments.

## Form B

### Information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern<sup>11</sup>

- |    |  |       |
|----|--|-------|
| 1. | Time of cognizance of the outbreak       | _____ |
| 2. | Location and approximate area affected   | _____ |
| 3. | Type of disease/intoxication             | _____ |
| 4. | Suspected source of disease/intoxication | _____ |
| 5. | Possible causative agent(s)              | _____ |
| 6. | Main characteristics of systems          | _____ |
| 7. | Detailed symptoms, when applicable       | _____ |
| -  | respiratory                              | _____ |
| -  | circulatory                              | _____ |
| -  | neurological/behavioural                 | _____ |

<sup>10</sup> It is understood that this may include organisms made pathogenic by molecular biology techniques, such as genetic engineering.

<sup>11</sup> See paragraph 2 of the chapeau to Confidence-Building Measure B.

- intestinal \_\_\_\_\_
- dermatological \_\_\_\_\_
- nephrological \_\_\_\_\_
- other \_\_\_\_\_
- 8. Deviation(s) from the normal pattern as regards
  - type \_\_\_\_\_
  - development \_\_\_\_\_
  - place of occurrence \_\_\_\_\_
  - time of occurrence \_\_\_\_\_
  - symptoms \_\_\_\_\_
  - virulence pattern \_\_\_\_\_
  - drug resistance pattern \_\_\_\_\_
  - agent(s) difficult to diagnose \_\_\_\_\_
  - presence of unusual vectors \_\_\_\_\_
  - other \_\_\_\_\_
- 9. Approximate number of primary cases \_\_\_\_\_
- 10. Approximate number of total cases \_\_\_\_\_
- 11. Number of deaths \_\_\_\_\_
- 12. Development of the outbreak \_\_\_\_\_
- 13. Measures taken \_\_\_\_\_

## Confidence-Building Measure "C"

### Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States parties continue to implement the following:

Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained in this research.

#### Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following:

1. It is recommended that basic research in biosciences, and particularly that directly related to the Convention should generally be unclassified and that applied research to the extent possible, without infringing on national and commercial interests, should also be unclassified.
2. States parties are encouraged to provide information on their policy as regards publication of results of biological research, indicating, *inter alia*, their policies as regards publication of results of research carried out in research centres and laboratories subject to exchange of information under item A and publication of research on outbreaks of diseases covered by item B, and to provide information on relevant scientific journals and other relevant scientific publications generally available to States parties.
3. The Third Review Conference discussed the question of cooperation and assistance as regards the safe handling of biological material covered by the Convention. It concluded that other international forums were engaged in this field and expressed its support for efforts aimed at enhancing such cooperation.

## Confidence-Building Measure "D"

(Deleted)

## Confidence-Building Measure "E"

### Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

At the Third Review Conference the States parties agreed to implement the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

As an indication of the measures which they have taken to implement the Convention, States parties shall declare whether they have legislation, regulations or other measures:

(a) To prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere;

(b) In relation to the export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants or of toxins in accordance with the Convention;

(c) In relation to biosafety and biosecurity.

States parties shall complete the attached form (Form E) and shall be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations, or written details of other measures on request to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs or to an individual State party. On an annual basis States parties shall indicate, also on the attached form, whether or not there has been any amendment to their legislation, regulations or other measures.

### Form E

#### Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

Relating to	Legislation	Regulations	Other measures <sup>12</sup>	Amended since last year
(a) Development, production stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	Yes/ <u>No</u>
(b) Exports of micro-organisms <sup>13</sup> and toxins	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	Yes/ <u>No</u>
(c) Imports of micro-organisms <sup>11</sup> and toxins	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	Yes/ <u>No</u>
(d) Biosafety <sup>14</sup> and biosecurity <sup>15</sup>	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Yes/No</u>	Yes/ <u>No</u>

<sup>12</sup> Including guidelines.

<sup>13</sup> Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the Convention.

## Confidence-Building Measure "F"

### Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

In the interest of increasing transparency and openness, States parties shall declare whether or not they conducted any offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes since 1 January 1946.

If so, States parties shall provide information on such programmes, in accordance with Form F.

### Form F

### Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

1. Date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party.

*06.02.1997*

2. Past offensive biological research and development programmes:

- Yes/No

- Period(s) of activities

- Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether work was performed concerning production, test and evaluation, weaponization, stockpiling of biological agents, the destruction programme of such agents and weapons, and other related research.

3. Past defensive biological research and development programmes:

- Yes/No

*QUANDHIP PROJECT (Quality Assurance Exercises and Networking on the Detection of Highly Infectious Pathogens)*

- Period(s) of activities

*Associated partner since 01.08.2011*

*Project activities until 31.07.2014*

*External Quality Assurance Exercises: 01.01.2012-21.03.2014*

- Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether or not work was conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination, and other related research, with location if possible.

*The QUANDHIP PROJECT is funded by the European Commission and its intention is to create a stabilized permanent consortium that links up and unites 38 highly specialized*

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<sup>14</sup> In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual or equivalent national or international guidance.

<sup>15</sup> In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance or equivalent national or international guidance.

*microbiological laboratories from 23 European countries, dealing with infectious bacteria (Risk Group 3) and viruses (Risk Group 4).*

*The project aims to exchange the best laboratory diagnostic practices within the laboratory network able to respond to any European highly infectious pathogens (HIPs) outbreaks. It establishes an external quality assurance, training and biosafety/biosecurity quality management system within a European infrastructure.*

*The objective of the External Quality Assurance Exercises is to enhance the laboratory preparedness and response capabilities for the detection of highly pathogenic bacterial and viral agents. Through these Exercises there will be developed an accepted laboratory diagnostic strategy and capabilities that will ensure a robust early diagnosis system.*

## **Confidence-Building Measure "G"**

### **Declaration of vaccine production facilities**

To further increase the transparency of biological research and development related to the Convention and to broaden scientific and technical knowledge as agreed in Article X, each State party will declare all facilities, both governmental and non-governmental, within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, producing vaccines licensed by the State party for the protection of humans. Information shall be provided on Form G attached.

### **Form G**

#### **Declaration of vaccine production facilities**

1. Name of facility:
  2. Location (mailing address):
  3. General description of the types of diseases covered:
-