DECLARATION FORM ON NOTHING TO DECLARE OR NOTHING NEW TO DECLARE FOR USE IN THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Measure	Nothing to declare	Nothing new to declare
A, part I		
A, part 2 (i)		
A, part 2 (ii)		
A, part 2 (iii)		
B (i)		
B (ii)		
C		
D		
E		
F		
G		

(Please mark the appropriate box(es) for each measure, with a tick.)

Date: 24 *May 2006*

State Party to the Convention: ***Sweden***

Form A, part 1

Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories[1]#1

1. Name(s) of facility[2] — ***Swedish Defence Research Agency***
   Division of NBC Defence

2. Responsible public or private organization or company — ***Swedish Defence Research Agency***

3. Location and postal address — ***Cementvägen 20, SE-901 82 Umeå, Sweden***

   www.foi.se

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

   Ministry of Defence, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Private Research Grants

5. Number of maximum containment units[3] within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m^2)

   0

6. If no maximum containment unit, indicate highest level of protection

   BSL3

7. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

   Medical countermeasures against BW
   The bacterial pathogens Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, Yersinia pestis (vaccine strains EV76 or KIM5), Francisella tularensis subsp holarctica and Pseudomonas aeruginosa as

[1]The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.
[2]For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".
[3]In accordance with the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. 2004 or equivalent

well as the viruses Hantaviruses, genotype, Puumala, Seoul, Hantaan and Dobrava and Rift Valley Fever virus (phlebovirus) are studied. The focus of the research is to identify and characterise key virulence factors of these pathogens and to evaluate the potential of theses factors as targets for therapy or as protective antigens in component vaccines. In another line of research bioinformatics and functional genomics is used to identify generic targets common to many bacterial pathogens that could serve as targets for generic treatment methods.

Methods for identification of BW

Methods are developed for detection and identification of bacteria, viruses and toxins using laser-induced Fluorescence, chip array, a variety of PCR methods, immunological techniques and masspectrometric methods. To be able to evaluate B-detection instruments using BW-stimulants, train NBC-company conscripts and to verify dispersion models field trial capacity for outdoor biological detection is established. The results are published in scientific journals.

Form A, part 1

Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories[4]#2

1. Name(s) of facility[5] — ***SMI:s säkerhetslaboratorium (BSL3-BSL4 Laboratory)***

2. Responsible public or private organization or company — ***Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control (SMI)***

3. Location and postal address — ***SMI, SE-171 82 Solna, Sweden***

   www.smittskyddsinstitutet.se

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

   Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (additional grants from Swedish Emergency Management Agency)

5. Number of maximum containment units[6] within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m^2)

   3 (20, 24 and 47)

6. If no maximum containment unit, indicate highest level of protection

7. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

[4]The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.

[5]For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".

[6]In accordance with the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. 2004 or equivalent

Work on BSL-3 agents

Bacteria. Containment units (BSL-3) are used for diagnostic and research work on bacteria: Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp, Francisella tularensis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Yersinia pestis.
Viruses. Containment units (BSL-3) are used for diagnostic and research work on virus: Bunyaviruses, Flaviviruses, Arenaviruses, Rabies viruses, Avian Influensa virus.

Work on BSL-4 agents

Containment units (BSL-4) are used for diagnostic and research work on virus: Bunyaviruses, Flaviviruses, Arenaviruses, Filoviruses, SARS CoV and highly pathogenic Avian influensa virus.

Methods for detection and evaluation of antibiotic resistance

National and international standard methods are used for detection. Cultivation, staining, ELISA, PCR, Q-PCR and microarrays are examples of methods in use. Development of diagnostic methods for BSL-3and BSL-4 agents is based on genetic techniques as well as recombinant technology.

The general goals are to: improve laboratory diagnostics and basic knowledge on highly pathogenic agents. The studies include, in addition to development of efficient and reliable diagnostics, e.g. virulence, pathogenesis, animal models and vaccine development.

The activities are funded mainly by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, National Board of Health (SoS), Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Swedish Research Council, and the European Union.

Form A, part 1

Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories[7] **#3**

1. Name(s) of facility[8] — ***National Veterinary Institute***

2. Responsible public or private organization or company — ***National Veterinary Institute***

3. Location and postal address — ***Ulls väg 2 B, Ultuna Campus***
SE-751 89 Uppsala, Sweden

www.sva.se

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Agriculture and grants from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency

5. Number of maximum containment units[9] within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m^2)

0

6. If no maximum containment unit, indicate highest level of protection

4 different containment units are designed according to BSL 3 laboratory work with a total size of 296 m^2

7. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

[7]The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.
[8]For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".
[9]In accordance with the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. 2004 or equivalent

General description of activities of the National Veterinary Institute

The National Veterinary Institute (SVA) is a Swedish national authority that strives for good animal and human health, a good environment and sustainable food production. SVA is a national and international reference laboratory of some contagious and other serious infectious diseases of animals that may imply a threat to both animal and human health. SVA's most important task is to be well prepared in dealing with these diseases by rapid and reliable diagnosis in order to establish and limit possible outbreak, to prevent the spread of infection, and to limit economic losses. Research and development is of the utmost importance for solving the tasks and a publication list of relevant biological research can be obtained from SVA. Grants from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency are used for preparedness purposes applied to the development of diagnostic methods for an emergency situation such as natural outbreaks, accidents and/or deliberate release of BSL-3 agents.

Work on BSL-3 micro-organisms

Containment units (BSL 3, 81 m^2) are used for diagnostic work on bacteria: Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp, Chlamydophila psittaci, Francisella tularensis, Mycobacterium bovis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Yersinia pestis.

Containment units (BSL 3, 155 m^2) are used for diagnostic work on virus: Hanta virus, Heptatitis E virus, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCM), High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) virus, Rabies virus, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopati (TSE), West Nile virus.

Methods for detection and evaluation of antibiotic resistance

National and international standard methods are used for detection. Cultivation, staining, ELISA and PCR are examples of methods in use. Development of diagnostic methods for BSL-3 agents is based on genetic techniques such as real-time PCR. Development of methods to characterise antibiotic resistance in BSL-3 agents is based on phenotypic micro dilutions methods such as (VETmic ™), and genetic methods such as PCR and sequencing.

Form A, part 2 (i)

National biological defence research and development programme Declaration

Is there a national programme to conduct biological defence research and development within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or control anywhere? Activities of such a programme would include prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

YES

If the answer is Yes, complete Form A, part 2 (ii) which will provide a description of the programme.

Form A, part 2 (ii)

National biological defence research and development programme

Description

1. State the objectives and funding of the programme and summarize the principal research and development activities conducted in the programme. Areas to be addressed shall include: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

Objectives:

Medical countermeasures against BW

The bacterial pathogens Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, Yersinia pestis (vaccine strains EV76 or KIM5), Francisella tularensis subsp holarctica and Pseudomonas aeruginosa as well as the viruses Hantaviruses, genotype, Puumala, Seoul, Hantaan and Dobrava and Rift Valley Fever virus (phlebovirus) are studied. The focus of the research is to identify and characterise key virulence factors of these pathogens and to evaluate the potential of theses factors as targets for therapy or as protective antigens in component vaccines. In another line of research bioinformatics and functional genomics is used to identify generic targets common to many bacterial pathogens that could serve as targets for generic treatment methods.

Methods for identification of BW

Methods are developed for detection and identification of bacteria, viruses and toxins using laser-induced Fluorescence, chip array, a variety of PCR methods, immunological techniques and masspectrometric methods. To be able to evaluate B-detection instruments using BW-stimulants, train NBC-company conscripts and to verify dispersion models field trial capacity for outdoor biological detection is established. The results are published in scientific journals.

2. State the total funding for the programme and its source.

25.7 million SEK by Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Foreign Affairs

3. Are aspects of this programme conducted under contract with industry, academic institutions, or in other non-defence facilities?

NO

4. If yes, what proportion of the total funds for the programme is expended in these contracted or other facilities?

2%

Form A, part 2 (iii)

National biological defence research and development programme#1

Information under paragraph IX for year 2005 (list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work during the previous 12 months)

Publication of relevant biological research at FOI NBC Defence

The recommendation for publication, at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, is to publish results of biological research in international journals. Some results are published as public FOI-reports, abstract of which are submitted to the NTIS Database (National Technical Information Service). Reprints of scientific papers and FOI-reports can be ordered by writing to: Swedish Defence Research Agency, SE-901 82 Umeå, Sweden.

List of publication for 2005

Camp S, Zhang L, Marquez M, de la Torre B, Long JM, Bucht G, Taylor P. Acetylcholinesterase (AChE) gene modification in transgenic animals: functional consequences of selected exon and regulatory region deletion. Chem Biol Interact. (2005). 15;157-158:79-86.

Patrik Johansson, Doctoral thesis; "Implications of Local Puumala Hantavirus Genetics and Epidemiology for Diagnostics and Vaccine Developments". (2005-06-03) Umeå University Medical Dissertations New series No 964-ISSN 0346-6612-ISBN 91-7305-878-5

Katarina Lahti., Mapping of Hantavirus Nucleocapsid protein Epitopes Inducing Cross-reactivity. 2005. Degree Project in Engineering Biology 20p.

Larsson P, Petra C.F.Oyston, Patrick Chain, May C. Chu, Melanie Duffield, Hans-Henrik Fuxelius, Emilio Garcia, Greger Hälltorp, Daniel Johansson, Karen E. Isherwood, Peter D. Karp, Eva Larsson, Ying Liu, Stephen Michell, Joann Prior, Richard Prior, Stephanie Malfatti, Anders Sjostedt, Kerstin Svensson, Lisa Vergez, Jonathan K. Wagg, Brendan W. Wren, Luther E. Lindler, Siv G.E. Andersson, Mats Forsman, Richard W. Titball. 2005. Complete genome sequence of Francisella tularensis the causative agent of tularemia. NATURE genetics, 37:153-159.

Svensson K, Larsson P., Johansson D., Byström M., Forsman M., and Johansson A.. 2005. Evolution of subspecies of Francisella tularensis. J. Bacteriol. 187:3903-3908.

Lundquist M., Caspersen M. B., Wikström P., and Forsman M. 2005. Discrimination of *Francisella tularensis* Subspecies using Surface Enhanced Laser Desorption Ionization Mass Spectrometry and Multivariate Data Analysis. FEMS Microbiology , 243: 303–310

Havlasová J., Hernychová L., Brychta M., Hubálek M., Lenco J., Larsson P., Lundqvist M., Forsman M., Kročová Z., Stulík J.,Macela A. 2005. Proteomic analysis of anti-Francisella tularensis LVS antibody response in murine model of tularemia . Proteomics 5:2090-2103.

Waldenstrom J, Mevius D, Veldman K, Broman T, Hasselquist D, Olsen B. 2005. Antimicrobial resistance profiles of Campylobacter jejuni isolates from wild birds in Sweden. Appl Environ Microbiol.71:2438-41.

Axelsson-Olsson D, Waldenstrom J, Broman T, Olsen B, Holmberg M. 2005. Protozoan Acanthamoeba polyphaga as a potential reservoir for Campylobacter jejuni**.** Appl Environ Microbiol.71:987-92.

Forsman M., and Johansson A.2005. Tularemia. In Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defence. (Eds. Richard F. Pitch and Raymond A. Zilinskas. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken NJ. pp 483-488.

Byström M., Böcher S., Prag J., Magnusson A., Johansson A. 2005. Tularemia in Denmark: Francisella tularensis Subspecies holarctica Identification by Real-Time PCR and High-Resolution Typing by Multiple-Locus Variable-Number Tandem Repeat Analysis. J. Clin. Microbiol. 43:5355-5358

Twine S, Byström M, Chen W, Forsman M, Golovliov I., Johansson A., Kelly J., Lindgren H., Svensson K, Zingmark C., Conlan W, Sjöstedt A. 2005.A mutant of Francisella tularensis strain SCHU S4 lacking the ability to express a 58-kDa protein is attenuated for virulence and an effective live vaccine. Inf. Immun. 73:8345-8352

Abd H., Claesson O., Ericsson S., Forsman M., Thorpsten J. 2005. B-sanering – Saneringseffekten hos CASCAD, E-95 och hetvatten på bakterier, virus och sporer. FOI-R—1016—SE.

Guala Dimitri. 2005. Identification of Francisella tularensis indels markers. FOI-report. FOI-R-1700-SE.

Bröms JB, Edqvist, PJ, Carlsson KE, Forsberg, Å, and Francis MS. 2005. Mapping an YscY binding domain within the LcrH chaperone that is required for regulation of *Yersinia* type III secretion. J bacteriol. 77:38-52.

Jonsson Per Kullander Fredrik Tiihonen Mikael Nordstrand Melker Tjärnhage Torbjörn Wästerby Pär Olofsson Göran Lindgren Mikael
Development of fluorescence-based LIDAR technology for biological sensing.
San Francisco, 28 March - 1 April 2005

Jonsson Per Kullander Fredrik Wästerby Pär Tiihonen Mikael Lindgren Mikael
Detection of fluorescence spectra of individual bioaerosol particles. Bruges, Belgium, 26-28 September 2005 (FOI-S--1973--SE) (SPIE Europe Sumposium Optics/Photonics in Security & Defence)

Forensic Identification of Neat Ricin and of Ricin from Crude Castor Bean Extracts by Mass Spectrometry.
Sten-Åke Fredriksson, Albert G. Hulst, Elisabeth Artursson, Ad. L. de Jong, Calle Nilsson and Ben L. M. van Baar.
Anal. Chem.2005, 77,1545-1555.

Form A, part 2 (iii)

National biological defence research and development programme#2

Information under paragraph IX for year 2004 (list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work during the previous 12 months)

Publication of relevant biological research at Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control (SMI)

The recommendation for publication, at the Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control, is to publish results of biological research in international journals. Reprints of scientific papers can be ordered by writing to:

Center for microbiological preparedness, Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control, SE-171 82 Solna, Sweden

List of publication for 2005

Klingström J, Falk K, Lundkvist Å. (2005) Delayed viremia and antibody responses in Puumala hantavirus challenged passively immunized cynomolgus macaques. Arch Virol, 150:79-92.

Åkerström S, Mousavi-Jazi M, Leijon M, Lundkvist Å, Mirazimi A. (2005) Nitric oxide inhibits the replication cycle of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) Coronavirus. J Virology, 79:1966-9.

Lindegren G, Vene S, Lundkvist Å, Falk K. (2005). Otimised diagnosis of acute dengue fever in Swedish travelers by combination of RT-PCR and IgM detection. J Clin Microbiol, 43:2850-2855.

Hardestam J, Klingström J, Mattsson K, Lundkvist Å. (2005) HFRS causing hantaviruses do not induce apoptosis in confluent Vero E6 and A-549 cells. J Med Virol. 76:234-240.

Nordström H, Falk K, Lindegren G, Mouzavi-Jazi M, Johansson A, Elgh F, Nilsson P, Lundkvist Å. (2005) DNA microarray technique for detection and identification of seven flaviviruses pathogenic for man. J Med Virol, 77:528-540.

Form B (i)

Background information on outbreaks of reportable infectious human diseases

Disease	2005	Number of reported cases per year 2001	2002	2003	2004
Population		*8908*	*8940*	*8961,593*	*8996*
Amoeba infection		456	419	416	
Atypical mycobacteria	348	247	250	269	311
Botulism	1	0	0	2	0
Campylobacter infection	6796	8577	7137	7149	6169
Diphteria	0	0	0	0	0
EHEC O157		96	129	73	182
Giardiosis	1151	1438	1436	1360	1327
Gonorrhoea	691	529	505	596	556
Yellow fever	0	0	0	0	0
Haemophilus infl. type b		19	21	23	73
Hepatitis A	93	169	76	122	136
Hepatitis B	1438	1517	1734	1940	1767
Hepatitis C	2610	3493	3382	3222	2979
Hepatitis D	11	9	12	6	6
Hepatitis E	10	2	5	3	7
HIV infection	392	277	287	379	426

HTLV I	0	3	5	5	3 (HTLV I/HTLV II)
HTLV II	7	1	2	1	
Pertussis	1360	979	1350	664	1571
Chlamydia	33060	22266	24692	26803	32075
Cholera	1	0	0	1	1
Legionellosis	107	84	94	80	116
Listeriosis	40	67	40	48	45
Malaria	114	161	140	113	109
Meningococcal infection	58	75	47	56	59
MRSA	975	425	442	549	712
Anthrax	0	0	0	0	0
Measels	13	5	9	3	5
Puumala virus infection (HFRS)	329	361	262	180	451
Ornithosis	5	12	13	12	7
Paratyphoid	21	21	25	16	30
Plague	0	0	0	0	0
Pc-resist. Pneumococci	664	627	525	562	653
Polio	0	0	0	0	0
Mumps	81	22	15	8	30
Rabies	0	0	0	0	0
Rubella	0	3	1	0	0
Salmonellosis (total)	3571	4711	3894	3794	3646

Salmonellosis (domestic)	655	671	819	805	514
Shigellosis	571	540	379	372	470
Tetanus	1	1	0	0	0
Syphilis	99	78	128	179	190
Toxoplasmosis		18	10	17	
Trichinosis	0	0	0	0	1
Tuberculosis	575	428	418	445	465
Tularemia	246	27	160	698	224
Typhoid	8	10	12	14	8
Ulcus molle	2	1	1	0	1
VRE	33	18	19	46	23
Viral hemorragic fevers	0	0	0	0	0
Yersiniosis	742	579	610	714	804
Relapsing fever	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**47847**	**48352**	**48686**	**50945**	

Brucellosis	14				3
Cryptosporidiosis	69				46
Dengue fever	62				24
Echinococcosis	12				9
Entamoeba histolytica	303				358
Streptococcal infection, group A	252				119
Haemophilius influenzae invasiv	118				73

Leptospiriosis	3				2
Pneumococcal infection, invasive	1420				406
Q fever	3				1
Total					**56822**

Form B (ii)

Information on outbreaks of infectious human diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern

There are no cases for the reporting period on outbreaks of infectious human diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern.

Form B (i)

Background information on outbreaks of reportable infectious animal diseases

Disease	Number of outbreaks per year				
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Botulism[1]	-	3	4	5	2
EHEC[2]	4	2	0	1	4
Malignant catarrhal fever (MCF)[3]	9	7	7	5	8
Newcastle disease[4]	1	-	1	1	2
Psittacosis[5]	1	4	3	5	1
Tuberculosis[6]	1	-	-	1	1
Tularemia[7]	-	4	11	2	5
Salmonella Infection (Salmonellosis)[8]					

[1] The cases originate from following animals: cattle, poultry, mallard, jackdaw, dog, gull

[2] Infections caused by Verocytotoxic E. coli O157 (often referred to EHEC in many reports) are notifiable in animals if there is an epidemiological link to human infection. Animal species: cattle, goat

[3] The cases originate from following animals: cattle, sheep

[4] The cases originate from following animals: poultry, fowls

[5] The cases originate from following animals: birds, partridge, parrot

[6] The cases originate from following animals: elephant. The outbreak of 2004 was diagnosed and confirmed during 2005.

[7] The cases originate from following animals: hare, squirrel, monkey.

[8] Any finding of Salmonella in animals, humans, feed and food of animal origin is notifiable. Reprints of the annual report "trends and sources of zoonootic infections recorded in Sweden" can be obtained from the Swedish Zoonosis Center at SVA, which includes Salmonella cases in animals, humans, feed and food.

Form B (ii)

Information on outbreaks of infectious animal diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern

There are no cases for the reporting period on outbreaks of infectious human diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern.

4. **CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE "C":**

- **<u>Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge</u>**

See under Form A, part 2 (iii), information provided under paragraph IX.

Form D

Active promotion of contacts #1

1. Planned international conferences, symposia, seminars, and other similar forums for exchange

   For each such event, the following information should be provided:

   - name of the conference, etc.
     The ninth international symposium on protection against chemical and biological warfare agents.

   - arranging organization(s), etc.
     Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) together with several other Swedish defence authorities, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

   - time ***June 2007***

   - place ***Gothenburg, Sweden***

   - main subject(s) for the conference, etc.
     CBW protection, in a broad sense. Focus on technical and scientific reports and discussions. Exhibition.

   - conditions for participation
     Open for people professionally active in any of the fields.

   - point of contact for further information, registration, etc.
     Mrs. Marianne Olofsson, FOI (Marianne.olofsson@foi.se)

Form E

Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

Relating to		Legislation	Regulations	Other measures	Amended since last year
(a)	Development, production stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I	***YES***	***YES***	***YES***	***NO***
(b)	Exports of micro-organisms* and toxins	***YES***	***YES***	***YES***	***NO***
(c)	Imports of micro-organisms* and toxins	***YES***	***YES***	***YES***	***NO***

Comments: A list of Swedish laws and regulations can be found in documents:

BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.62 of 4 September 2003
(BTWC and related legislation prepared by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom).

BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.17 of 16 July 2004
(A short introduction to the Swedish system to manage outbreaks of infectious diseases among humans and animals).

* Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the Convention.

Form F

Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

1. Date of entry into force of the Convention for the State party.

   5 February 1976

   (The Convention was signed by Sweden on 27 February 1975. The Convention was ratified by Sweden on 5 February 1976 and entered into force for Sweden the same date. The text of the Convention is published in the Swedish Treaty Series, SÖ 1976:18)

2. Past offensive biological research and development programmes:

   - ***NO***

3. Past defensive biological research and development programmes:

   - ***NO***

Form G

Declaration of vaccine production facilities#1

1. Name of facility:

SBL Vaccin AB (Solna)

2. Location (mailing address):

SE-105 21 Stockholm, Sweden

3. General description of the types of diseases covered:

Diarrhoea, ETEC/Cholerae (one vaccine component for pooling with other components)

Form G

Declaration of vaccine production facilities#2

1. Name of facility:

UniTech Biopharma

2. Location (mailing address):

Box 219, SE-864 31 Matfors, Sweden

3. General description of the types of diseases covered:

Diarrhoea, ETEC/Cholerae (culturing on commission)