Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Confidence Building Measures

Annual Report by **Austria** in accordance with the final declaration of the 7th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Covering the year **2013**

Declaration form on Nothing to Declare or Nothing New to Declare for use in the information exchange

Measure	Nothing to declare	Nothing new to declare	Year of last declaration if nothing new to declare
A, part 1		X	2012
A, part 2 (i)		X	2012
A, part 2 (ii)		X	2012
A, part 2 (iii)		X	2012
B	X		
C			
E		X	2012
F	X		
G	X		

(Please mark the appropriate box(es) for each measure with a tick, and fill in the year of last declaration in the last column where applicable.)

Date: **April 8, 2014**

State Party to the Convention: **AUSTRIA**

Date of ratification/accession to the Convention: **10.08.1973**

National point of contact:

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Active promotion of contacts

The 3rd Review Conference agreed that States parties continue to implement the following:

"Active promotion of contacts between scientists, other experts and facilities engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges and visits for joint research on a mutually agreed basis."

In order to actively promote professional contacts between scientists, joint research projects and other activities aimed at preventing or reducing the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and at improving international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, the Seventh Review Conference encouraged States parties to share forward looking information, to the extent possible,

- on planned international conferences, seminars, symposia and similar events dealing with biological research directly related to the Convention, and
- on other opportunities for exchange of scientists, joint research or other measures to promote contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention,

including through the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Confidence-Building Measures “A”:

Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to implement the following:

"Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention."

Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

Data should be provided by States Parties on each facility, within their territory or under their jurisdiction or control anywhere, which has any maximum containment laboratories meeting those criteria for such maximum containment laboratories as specified in the latest edition of the WHO[1] Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or OIE[2] Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent guidelines adopted by relevant international organisations, such as those designated as biosafety level 4 (BL4, BSL4 or P4) or equivalent standards.

States Parties that do not possess a facility meeting criteria for such maximum containment should continue to Form A, part 1 (ii).

[1] World Health Organization
[2] World Organization for Animal Health

Form A, part 1 (i)

Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories[3]

1. Name(s) of facility[4] **Federal Ministry of Defence**
   Armament and Defence Technology Agency
   NBC & Environmental Protection Technology Division

2. Responsible public or private organization or company: Government (MoD)

3. Location and postal address:
   Laboratory Location: Robert Koch-Gasse 17, A-2340 MÖDLING
   Head Office: Roßauer Lände 1, A-1090 VIENNA

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity (including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Science, …)
   Government (MoD)

5. Number of maximum containment units[5] within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m^2)
   0

6. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate
   Providing expertise and analytical capacity for the MoD for the improvement of B-defence capabilities. Sampling and detection of potential B-warfare and bioterrorism agents. Evaluation of sampling and detection procedures. Agents: e.g. Bacillus sp., Yersinia sp., Brucella sp., Coxiella, Francisella sp., Burkholderia sp., Vibrio sp., Yellow Fever, VEE, Vaccinia, Ricin.

[3] The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.

[4] For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".

[5] In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, or equivalent.

Form A, part 1 (ii)

If no BSL4 facility is declared in Form A, part 1 (i), indicate the highest biosafety level implemented in facilities handling biological agents[6] on a State Party's territory:

Biosafety level 3[7]	**yes** / ~~no~~
Biosafety level 2[8] (if applicable)	yes / no

Any additional relevant information as appropriate:

1) **In addition to the Biosafety level 3 laboratory declared above, the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES) operates two more BSL 3 laboratories.**

   The AGES was formed in 2002 upon a Federal law (Health and Food Safety Act) as a private company with limited liability, with a public service mission. Therefore AGES is not governed by public law, but by private law. The largest part of our activities is public-sector noncommercial. As AGES is an independent agency within the federal administration. Therefore AGES does not receive any instructions or orders from the Government regarding its expert opinions and expert reports.

   The BSL 3 laboratories run by AGES Division of Public Health are:

   i) AGES IMED Vienna, Waehringerstrasse 25a, 1090 Vienna (62 sqm)
   ii) AGES IMED Graz, Beethovenstraße 6, 8010 Graz (34sqm)

   The laboratories are used for work pathogenic bacteria like Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Brucella spp., Francisella tularensis, Burkholderia mallei and Mycobacterium tuberculosis Complex on pure cultures of our strain collection and in human, animal and environmental samples.

2) **Additionally, there is information about four biosafety level 2 laboratories:**

   i) Name of facility: IST Austria, Am Campus 1, A-3400 Klosterneuburg
   Decription of activities: Basic research in biological science (no relation to defenxe development programmes)
   ii) Name of facility: Institute for Biomedical Aging Research of the University of Innsbruck (three BSL 2 laboratories)
   Description: All three labs are devoted to basic research only. One (room #006, floor area: 17 m2) is run by the Immunology group headed by Beatrix Grubeck-Loeben-

[6] Microorganisms pathogenic to humans and/or animals

[7] In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

[8] In accordance with the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual and/or the OIE Terrestrial Manual or other equivalent internationally accepted guidelines.

stein. In this lab Cytomegalovirus (CMV) is used for immune stimulation experiments in cells from elderly blood donors. In the BSL2 labs run by the Endocrinology group (headed by Peter Berger; room # 106; floor area: 13 m2) and the Cell Metabolism and Differentiation Research group (headed by Werner Zwerschke; room # 214; floor area: 9 m2), respectively, lentiviral vectors are produced for basic research projects.

Part 2: Exchange of information national biological defence / civil protection

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties are to implement the following:

In the interest of increasing the transparency of national research and development programmes on biological issues with **dual-use potential**, the States Parties will declare whether or not they conduct such programmes. States Parties agreed to provide, annually, detailed information on their biological defence research and development programmes including summaries of the objectives and costs of effort performed by contractors and in other facilities. If no biological research and development programme is being conducted, a null report will be provided.

States Parties will make declarations in accordance with the attached forms, which require the following information:

(1) The objective and summary of the research and development activities under way indicating whether work is conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research;

(2) Whether contractor or other non-defence facilities are utilized and the total funding provided to that portion of the programme;

(3) The organizational structure of the programme and its reporting relationships; and

(4) The following information concerning the defence and other governmental facilities in which the biological defence research and development programme is concentrated;

(a) location;

(b) the floor areas (m^2) of the facilities including that dedicated to each of BL2, BL3 and BL4 level laboratories;

(c) the total number of staff employed, including those contracted full time for more than six months;

(d) numbers of staff reported in (c) by the following categories: civilian, military, scientists, technicians, engineers, support and administrative staff;

(e) a list of the scientific disciplines of the scientific/engineering staff;

(f) the source and funding levels in the following three areas: research, development, and test and evaluation; and

(g) the policy regarding publication and a list of publicly-available papers and reports.

Form A, part 2 (i)

Are there any national programmes to conduct biological defence research and development within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or control anywhere? Activities of such programmes would include prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

Yes/~~No~~

If the answer is Yes, complete Form A, part 2 (ii) which will provide a description of each programme.

Form A, part 2 (ii)

National biological defence / civil protection (KIRAS – National Security Research Programm, Partner in FP7/H2020 Programme, Projects funded by the FWF – Austrian Science Fund etc.) research and development programmes Declaration

Asked are as well other ministries or departments that may have responsibility for civilian defence, counter-terrorism or other functions that involve biological research and development programmes or activities.

Description

1. State the objectives and funding of each programme and summarize the principal research and development activities conducted in the programme. Areas to be addressed shall include: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

   Diagnostic techniques: molecular (e.g. PCR, Real-Time PCR, sequencing)
   Microbiological Forensics
   Development and evaluation of test procedures
   Decontamination: evaluation of efficiency of B-decontamination products & procedures
   Evaluation of sampling procedures

2. State the total funding for each programme and its source.

   Source of funding: MoD
   Total funding 2013 approximately: Euro 89 000,-

3. Are aspects of these programmes conducted under contract with industry, academic institutions, or in other non-defence facilities?

   ~~Yes~~**/No**

4. If yes, what proportion of the total funds for each programme is expended in these contracted or other facilities?

5. Summarize the objectives and research areas of each programme performed by contractors and in other facilities with the funds identified under paragraph 4.

6. Provide a diagram of the organizational structure of each programme and the reporting relationships (include individual facilities participating in the programme).



7. Provide a declaration in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii) for each facility, both governmental and non-governmental, which has a substantial proportion of its resources devoted to each national biological defence research and development programme, within the territory of the reporting State, or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere.

Form A, part 2 (iii)

National biological defence / civil protection (KIRAS – National Security Research Programm, Partner in FP7/H2020 Programme, Projects funded by the FWF – Austrian Science Fund etc.) research and development programmes Declaration

Facilities

Complete a form for each facility declared in accordance with paragraph 7 in Form A, part 2 (ii).

In shared facilities, provide the following information for the biological defence research and development portion only.

1. What is the name of the facility?

Armament and Defence Technology Agency
Div NBC & Environmental Protection Technology

2. Where is it located (include both address and geographical location)?

Robert Koch-Gasse 17, A-2340 Mödling

3. Floor area of laboratory areas by containment level:

BL2 **38** (m²)

BL3 **45** (m²)

BL4 0 (m²)

Total laboratory floor area **83** (m²)

4. The organizational structure of each facility.

(i)	Total number of personnel	**3**
(ii)	Division of personnel:	
	Military	-
	Civilian	**3**
(iii)	Division of personnel by category:	
	Scientists	**2**
	Engineers	-
	Technicians	**1**
	Administrative and support staff	-

iv) List the scientific disciplines represented in the scientific/engineering staff.

Molecular Biology, Biochemistry/Microbiology

(v) Are contractor staff working in the facility? If so, provide an approximate number.

(vi) What is (are) the source(s) of funding for the work conducted in the facility, including indication if activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence?

100% MoD

(vii) What are the funding levels for the following programme areas:

Research	**80%**
Development	**15%**
Test and evaluation	**5%**

(viii) Briefly describe the publication policy of the facility:

Currently no publication activity

(ix) Provide a list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work published during the previous 12 months. (To include authors, titles and full references.)

5. Briefly describe the biological defence work carried out at the facility, including type(s) of micro-organisms[9] and/or toxins studied, as well as outdoor studies of biological aerosols.

Providing Expertise and analytical capacity for the Federal Ministry of Defence for Improvement of B-Defence capabilities.
Sampling and detection of potential B-warfare and bioterrorism agents.
Evaluation of sampling and detection procedures.
Agents: e.g. *Bacillus* sp., *Yersinia* sp., *Brucella* sp., *Coxiella*, *Francisella* sp., *Burkholderia* sp., *Vibrio* sp., Yellow Fever, VEE, Vaccinia, Ricin.

[9] Including viruses and prions.

Confidence-Building Measures "B":

Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to implement the following:

> Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins, and on all such events that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. The information provided on events that deviate from the norm will include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases.

The Seventh Review Conference agreed the following:

> No universal standards exist for what might constitute a deviation from the normal pattern.

Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

1. Exchange of data on outbreaks that seem to deviate from the normal pattern is considered particularly important in the following cases:
   - When the cause of the outbreak cannot be readily determined or the causative agent[10] is difficult to diagnose,
   - When the disease may be caused by organisms which meet the criteria for risk groups III or IV, according to the classification in the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual,
   - When the causative agent is exotic to a given geographical region,
   - When the disease follows an unusual pattern of development,
   - When the disease occurs in the vicinity of research centres and laboratories subject to exchange of data under item A,
   - When suspicions arise of the possible occurrence of a new disease.
2. In order to enhance confidence, an initial report of an outbreak of an infectious disease or a similar occurrence that seems to deviate from the normal pattern should be given promptly after cognizance of the outbreak and should be followed up by annual reports. To enable States Parties to follow a standardized procedure, the Conference has agreed that Form B should be used, to the extent information is known and/or applicable, for the exchange of annual information.
3. The declaration of electronic links to national websites or to websites of international, regional or other organizations which provide information on disease outbreaks (notably outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern) may also satisfy the declaration requirement under Form B.

[10] It is understood that this may include organisms made pathogenic by molecular biology techniques, such as genetic engineering.

4. In order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities and in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, States Parties are encouraged to invite experts from other States Parties to assist in the handling of an outbreak, and to respond favourably to such invitations, respecting applicable national legislation and relevant international instruments.

Form B

Information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences, that seems to deviate from the normal pattern[11]

The Ministry of Health an their relevant departments will in most cases be the source of information for diseases affecting humans, while the ministry of agriculture or equivalent agency will have data on outbreaks affecting animals and plants.

1. Time of cognizance of the outbreak _____

2. Location and approximate area affected _____

3. Type of disease/intoxication _____

4. Suspected source of disease/intoxication _____

5. Possible causative agent(s) _____

6. Main characteristics of systems _____

7. Detailed symptoms, when applicable _____
   - respiratory _____
   - circulatory _____
   - neurological/behavioural _____
   - intestinal _____
   - dermatological _____
   - nephrological _____
   - other _____

8. Deviation(s) from the normal pattern as regards
   - type _____
   - development _____
   - place of occurrence _____
   - time of occurrence _____
   - symptoms _____
   - virulence pattern _____
   - drug resistance pattern _____
   - agent(s) difficult to diagnose _____

[11] See paragraph 2 of the chapeau to Confidence-Building Measure B.

- presence of unusual vectors_____
- other_____

9. Approximate number of primary cases_____

10. Approximate number of total cases_____

11. Number of deaths_____

12. Development of the outbreak_____

13. Measures taken_____

Confidence-Building Measure "C"

Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge

At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States parties continue to implement the following:

Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained in this research.

Modalities

The Third Review Conference agreed on the following:

1. It is recommended that basic research in biosciences, and particularly that directly related to the Convention should generally be unclassified and that applied research to the extent possible, without infringing on national and commercial interests, should also be unclassified.

2. States parties are encouraged to provide information on their policy as regards publication of results of biological research, indicating, *inter alia*, their policies as regards publication of results of research carried out in research centres and laboratories subject to exchange of information under item A and publication of research on outbreaks of diseases covered by item B, and to provide information on relevant scientific journals and other relevant scientific publications generally available to States parties.

3. The Third Review Conference discussed the question of cooperation and assistance as regards the safe handling of biological material covered by the Convention. It concluded that other international forums were engaged in this field and expressed its support for efforts aimed at enhancing such cooperation.

Austria encourages publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention - the annual report of 2013 Austria draws the attention to the following publications:

i) Ruppitsch W, Stöger A, Indra A, Grif K, Schabereiter-Gurtner C, Hirschl A, Allerberger F. Suitability of partial 16S ribosomal RNA gene sequence analysis for the identification of dangerous bacterial pathogens. J Appl Microbiol. 2007 Mar;102(3):852-9. PubMed PMID: 17309636.

ii) Tomaso H, Jacob D, Eickhoff M, Scholz HC, Al Dahouk S, Kattar MM, Reischl U, Plicka H, Olsen JS, Nikkari S, Matero P, Beuret C, Ciammaruconi A, Lista F, Gala JL, Broll H, Appel B, Sellek Cano RE, Ybarra de Villavicencio Mdel C, Broekhuijsen M, Indra A, Petersen R, Neubauer H. Preliminary validation of real-time PCR assays for the identification of Yersinia pestis. Clin Chem Lab Med. 2008;46(9):1239-44. doi: 10.1515/CCLM.2008.251. PubMed PMID: 18783342.

iii) Poeppl, W., Orola, M., Herkner, H., Muller, M., Tobudic, S., Faas, A., ... & Burgmann, H. (2013). High prevalence of antibodies against leptospira spp. in male austrian adults: A cross-sectional survey, april to june 2009. Euro Surveill, 18, 20509.

iv) Poeppl, W., Herkner, H., Tobudic, S., Faas, A., Auer, H., Mooseder, G., ... & Walochnik, J. (2013). Seroprevalence and asymptomatic carriage of Leishmania spp. in Austria, a non-endemic European country. Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 19(6), 572-577.

v) Poeppl, W., Obwaller, A. G., Weiler, M., Burgmann, H., Mooseder, G., Lorentz, S., ... & Naucke, T. J. (2013). Emergence of sandflies (Phlebotominae) in Austria, a Central European country. Parasitology research, 112(12), 4231-4237.

vi) Contributions to the "15th International Meeting on Emerging Diseases and Surveillance" (IMED) 2013 in Vienna:

- **Cross-sectional survey on seroprevalence of hepatitis E virus in Austria (Heimo Lagler, Wolfgang Poeppl, Heidi Winkler, Harald Herkner, Angelus Faas, Gerhard Mooseder, Heinz Burgmann)**

- **VNTR-based epidemiological study of Francisella tularensis ssp. holarctica biovar II strains isolated from humans, European brown hares and red foxes in Austria from 1995 to 2010 (S. Revilla-Fernández, K. Reisp, E. Hofer, H. Plicka, F. Schmoll)**

vii) Contribution to the "Medical Biodefense Conference" 2013 in Munich: Cross-sectional survey on seroprevalence of hepatitis E virus in Austria (Adelheid Obwaller, Heimo Lagler, Wolfgang Poeppl, Angelus Faas, Gerhard Mooseder, Heinz Burgmann, Wolfgang Graninger)

viii) Lagler, H., Poeppl, W., Winkler, H., Herkner, H., Faas, A., Mooseder, G., & Burgmann, H. (2014). Hepatitis E Virus Seroprevalence in Austrian Adults: A Nationwide Cross-Sectional Study among Civilians and Military Professionals. PloS one, 9(2), e87669.

Confidence-Building Measure "D"

(Deleted)

Confidence-Building Measure "E"

Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

At the Third Review Conference the States parties agreed to implement the following, later amended by the Seventh Review Conference:

As an indication of the measures which they have taken to implement the Convention, States parties shall declare whether they have legislation, regulations or other measures:

(a) To prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere;

(b) In relation to the export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants or of toxins in accordance with the Convention;

(c) In relation to biosafety and biosecurity.

States parties shall complete the attached form (Form E) and shall be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations, or written details of other measures on request to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs or to an individual State party. On an annual basis States parties shall indicate, also on the attached form, whether or not there has been any amendment to their legislation, regulations or other measures.

Form E

Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

Relating to	Legislation	Regulations	Other measures[12]	Amended since last year
(a) Development, production stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I	**Yes. Prohibition also implicit in section 177a of the Penal Code**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**No**
(b) Exports of micro-organisms[13] and toxins	**Yes (EU Dual Use Regulation 428/2009)**	**Yes (EU Dual Use Regulation 428/2009)**	**Yes**	**No**
(c) Imports of micro-organisms[11] and toxins	**No**	**No**	**No**	**No**
(d) Biosafety[14] and biosecurity[15]	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**No**

Ad b) Legal Basis for the control of exports of micro-organisms and toxins is the EU Dual Use Regulation (Regulation (EC) 428/2009) in connection with the 2011Austrian Foreign Trade Act.

Ad c) There are no import restrictions for micro-organisms and toxins in these two instruments.

[12] Including guidelines.

[13] Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the Convention.

[14] In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual or equivalent national or international guidance.

[15] In accordance with the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance or equivalent national or international guidance.

Confidence-Building Measure "F"

Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

In the interest of increasing transparency and openness, States parties shall declare whether or not they conducted any offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes since 1 January 1946.

If so, States parties shall provide information on such programmes, in accordance with Form F.

Form F

Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

1. Date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party

   10.08.1973

2. Past offensive biological research and development programmes:

   - ~~Yes~~/**No**

   - Period(s) of activities

   - Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether work was performed concerning production, test and evaluation, weaponization, stockpiling of biological agents, the destruction programme of such agents and weapons, and other related research.

3. Past defensive biological research and development programmes:

   - ~~Yes~~/**No**

   - Period(s) of activities

   - Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether or not work was conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination, and other related research, with location if possible.

Confidence-Building Measure "G"

Declaration of vaccine production facilities

To further increase the transparency of biological research and development related to the Convention and to broaden scientific and technical knowledge as agreed in Article X, each State party will declare all facilities, both governmental and non-governmental, within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, producing vaccines licensed by the State party for the protection of humans. Information shall be provided on Form G attached. (One might also consider facilities which produce vaccines for animals or plant inoculants).

Form G

Declaration of vaccine production facilities

1. Name of facility:

2. Location (mailing address):

3. General description of the types of diseases covered: